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COOPERATION WITH FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS: EXPERIENCES OF TRUTH
TELLING AND EMBELLISHMENT
Ellen Yaroshefsky"
"Cooperation is all about perception shaped by personality."
Anonymous Lawyer
INTRODUCTIONINDEPENDENT Counsel Kenneth Starr exposed to public scrutiny a
routine, and key, prosecutorial technique: obtaining information
and testimony from people who can offer incriminating information
against others in exchange for promises of leniency. The enormous
pressures placed on witnesses to cooperate with the government were
highlighted by Monica Lewinsky's public ordeal in obtaining an
agreement that shielded her and her mother from prosecution and by
Susan McDougal's lengthy incarceration resulting from her refusal to
cooperate with the Office of the Independent Counsel ("0IC").
Subsequently, Julie Hiatt Steele's failure to cooperate with the 0IC
spotlighted the extensive pressure that the government can exert.'
While prosecutors acknowledge that they have the power to exert
such pressure on witnesses, they believe that they exercise better
judgment and restraint than the 0IC and are dismayed that they are
criticized as a consequence of Starr's investigatory practices.
* Clinical Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. The author
expresses her gratitude to all of those who gave generously of their time to be
interviewed for this Article. I want to thank Bruce Green, Gerard Lynch, Jonathan
Oberman, Dan Richman, Barry Scheck, Fred Zacharias, and the anonymous
interviewees who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Adam
Lurie, a Cardozo law student, and Sarah Carney, a City University of New York
graduate student in social psychology, for their valuable research.
1. Julie Hiatt Steele was offered immunity if she cooperated with the OIC in
providing information about comments that Kathleen Wiley purportedly made about
the President's unwelcome sexual advances. Steele claimed that the OIC exerted
pressure on her to testify in accordance with the OIC's version of the evidence. She
refused to do so and was prosecuted. Ms. Steele was accused of making false
statements that hindered an investigation. The case ended in a mistrial on May 7,
1999 when the jurors pronounced themselves hopelessly deadlocked. See Florence
Graves, Starr and Willey: The Untold Story, The Nation, May 17, 1999, at 11; David
Stout, Starr Drops All Charges Against Two Women, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1999, at
A28.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Prosecutors do not believe that Starr's heavy-handed tactics are
reflective of practices in the United States Attorney's offices
throughout the country. Informal surveys reveal that federal
prosecutors are quite critical of Starr and believe that his investigation
was an aberration for two reasons. First is the well-documented lack
of oversight under the Independent Counsel Act and the unlimited
money and time to pursue one case.2 Second is Starr's lack of
experience as a prosecutor.
A central but relatively unexamined issue that arose in the wake of
the OIC investigation is the manner in which prosecutors work with
cooperators and the extent to which prosecutors can determine
whether those cooperators are truthful. While the risk that
cooperators will provide false evidence is a longstanding, well-
documented concern,3 there are few studies that examine whether that
risk is realized in any significant measure. Nor are there studies that
attempt to examine the manner in which cooperators actually work
with prosecutors and the extent to which prosecutors can determine
whether these cooperators are truthful.4 This issue is a crucial one in
the federal criminal justice system because the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines5 have caused a sea change in the use of cooperators.
While cooperation with federal authorities is not new,6 the
Sentencing Guidelines have created a system with cooperation as its
2- See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Independent Counsel statute operates in an "area where so little is law and so
much is discretion, [and it is] intentionally cut off from the unifying influence of the
Justice Department"); Herman Schwartz, Prosecutors: Unleashing the Unstoppable,
L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1999, at Ml.
3. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 Vand.
L. Rev. 1, 7-12 (1992); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in
the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50
Rutgers L. Rev. 199, 207 (1997) [hereinafter Lee, From Gatekeeper]; Daniel C.
Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 97 n.98 (1995); Christine J.
Saverda, Note, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary
Standards, 100 Yale L.J. 785,787 (1990).
4. Many commentators believe that perjury is pervasive in the criminal justice
system. See Saverda, supra note 3, at 788 (discussing concern over failure to enforce
perjury statute). See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev.
809 (1977) (discussing attorney's ethical responsibility with regard to client perjury).
5. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
at 18 USC §§ 3551-3673 (1994)). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are found in
each year's updated United Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual and are
referred to herein as "guidelines."
6. Forms of cooperation have long been recognized in English common law. In
1878, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged informal immunity agreements
for accomplices. See United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878) (the Whiskey
Cases); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 810, 815 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Richman, supra note 3, at 85-86. Cooperation, in this context, refers to the process by
which a federal criminal defendant provides assistance in the prosecution or
investigation of others to obtain the benefit of sentence mitigation.
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locus. There is significantly more cooperation under the guidelines?
because greater stakes increase the incentives to cooperate with the
government.' Every defendant or target of an investigation must
contemplate cooperation with federal authorities. Moreover, it is
particularly within the purview of the federal prosecutor to make a
decision as to whether she will seek a downward departure based
upon her determination that a defendant is deserving of the benefit
that truthful cooperation provides.
Many commentators have noted that the cooperation process and
cooperation agreements are subjects in need of further study
Nevertheless, there has been little, if any, study of the cooperation
process for a number of reasons.10 Most significantly, analysis of the
7. See Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper
Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 423, 424 (1997);
Justin M. Lungstrum, Note, United States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in the Name of
a Good Cause, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 749, 753 n.37 (1999) (explaining that after the
enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines cooperation has increased); G. Adam
Schweickert, HI, Comment, Third-Party Cooperation: A Welcome Addition to
Substantial Assistance Departure Jurisprudence, 30 Conn. L Rev. 1445, 1449 (1998)
("The implementation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentencing has led to a ten-fold increase in cooperation from indicted
individuals." (citation omitted)).
8. See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L Rev. 563,
564 (1999) [hereinafter Weinstein, Regulating the Market]. For an explanation of the
charge-offense based system of the Sentencing Guidelines and the significant increase
in consequences for defendants, see Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L Rev. 1342 (1997)
(discussing real-offense and charge-offense systems); Jeffrey Standen, Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1471, 1514 (1993); Jack B.
Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 Fed. Sent. Rep. 6, 6-7 (1992) [hereinafter Weinstein, Trial Judge's
Reflections] (describing the importance of substantial assistance departures).
9. See generally David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26
Fordham Urb. LJ. 509 (1999) (discussing the need to take more seriously issues
regarding the cooperation process). See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 3, at 4 (noting the
need for detailed scrutiny in the future); Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer,
Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal
Policy and Practice, U.S. Sent. Comm'n, January 1998, at 10 (arguing that substantial
assistance criteria need further study).
10. There is a significant body of literature on the Sentencing Guidelines and
analysis of substantial assistance departures, but there is little study of the
cooperation process. See articles cited in O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1343 n.2 (arguing
that a charge-offense system would compromise the goals of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines). See generally The Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group, U.S.
Sent. Comm., Federal Court Practices: Sentence Reductions Based on Defendants'
Substantial Assistance to the Government, app. A references (May 1997) (discussing
findings of a detailed study of the policies, practices, and general observations
emerging from the application of section SK1.1) [hereinafter Substantial Assistance
Staff Working Group]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines:
A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901 (1991) (looking at the movement
from individualized to aggregated sentencing); Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 Conn. L. Rev.
569 (1997) (analyzing discretion exercised through sentencing departures); Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
1999]
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cooperation process does not lend itself to traditional methods of
scholarly study. By its nature, dealing with cooperators is dependent
on a constellation of factors whose impact on the process is extremely
difficult to analyze. These factors include significant differences
between state and federal justice systems," and among state systems.
Within the ninety-four United States Attorney's offices, there are
significant differences in legal culture and traditions, office policies
and priorities, structure and practice, and differences in the amount of
discretion afforded individual prosecutors in given cases.' 2 Moreover,
a myriad of other factors exist that necessarily affect the cooperation
process including the personality of individual prosecutors, the quality
of defense lawyering, the interaction of prosecutors with individual
defense lawyers, the type and strength of the case, the government
agency handling the investigation and the quality of the agents, the
evolving state of the law, and differences among cooperators. 3 It
would be extremely difficult to quantify these factors in order to
develop a coherent analysis of the process of cooperation and derive
useful information regarding the extent to which prosecutors
determine the truthfulness of cooperators' statements.
A second potential reason for the lack of analysis is that "most
prosecutors and defense lawyers "operate under a tacit agreement to
refrain from speaking publicly about how the system works." 4 While
these discussions often occur informally and within small circles of
attorneys, it is in the interest of all parties to keep hidden the subtle
pas de deux of cooperation that permits targets to obtain benefits
from the government. 5
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681 (1992) (examining the problem created by
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and suggesting corrective action); Hughes, supra
note 3 (identifying cooperation agreements as a subject worthy of detailed scrutiny in
the future); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 105 (1994) (suggesting a revision of
substantial assistance determinations); Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9 (discussing
current federal policies and practices in the Post-Sentencing Reform Act era);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833 (1992) (highlighting problems
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
11. Striking differences between state and federal systems include investigatory
resources, types of crimes prosecuted, and the extent to which uncorroborated
cooperators' testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Sixteen states recognize
the inherent unreliability of accomplice testimony and require corroboration of an
accomplice's testimony to sustain a conviction. See Saverda, supra note 3, at 791 n.40.
12 See James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the
Political and Legal Systems 4-12 (1978); Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9, at 7
(noting the different internal standards for 5K1.1 process).
13. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-
Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1284, 1294-300 (1997).
14. Harvey A. Silverglate & Andrew Good, It Didn't Start With Ken Starr: Starr
Teaches, Reason, May 1999, at 26,28.
15. See id. In the Southern District of New York, many white collar defense
[Vol. 68
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Most federal criminal cases are resolved based, at least in part, on
the anticipated or actual testimony of cooperating defendants.
Accomplice testimony is often the most damaging evidence against a
defendant because the cooperator has first-hand knowledge of the
pattern of criminal activity. Consequently, a cooperator can
manipulate the details of the events without arousing much, if any,
suspicion and still be believable to a jury." With cooperation being so
central to the process, it is essential that prosecutors are relying on
truthful evidence from cooperators. Thus, the problems in handling
cooperators present a significant area ripe for analysis.
18
There are a host of issues ripe for study about the cooperation
process and the role of cooperators. Among those that I decided to
study are (1) the extent to which prosecutors believe that they are
able to obtain truthful information from cooperators and the basis for
those beliefs, (2) safeguards and techniques utilized to assure the
truthfulness of cooperators, and (3) perceived problems with
obtaining truthful information from cooperators. 9
In this Article I address the results of that study, relying primarily
on interviews about the cooperation process that I conducted with
former assistant United States Attorneys and other defense attorneys.
In Part I, I explain the methodology used in conducting the interviews
and the context of the cooperation process. In Part II, I explore the
results of the interviews and discuss the principle reasons that
prosecutors may rely on inaccurate cooperator testimony. I conclude
that prosecutors' reliance on inaccurate cooperator testimony is a
problem within the criminal justice system that warrants further study
and reform.
lawyers are former Assistant United States Attorneys and are part of a self-selected
group of lawyers, The Federal Bar Council, where such relatively frank discussions
occur.
Another reason for the tacit agreement of silence is a lawyer's economic incentive
for referrals in future cases. See Richman, supra note 3, at 120-23.
16. See Saverda, supra note 3, at 787; Wolfram, supra note 4, at 834 (indicating
instances in which cooperators lie convincingly before a jury).
17. The presumptive unreliability of accomplice testimony is beyond dispute and
courts and commentators recognize that the chances of perjury are increased when a
cooperator testifies in exchange for any consideration. See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952); Saverda,
supra note 3, at 787.
18. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9, at 18-19 (concluding that data revealed
need for further study on standards for substantial assistance departures including
consideration of legally irrelevant factors such as gender, race, and ethnicity); Hon.
Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47
Hastings LJ. 1381,1382 (1996).
19. There are many other issues in need of study regarding the use of cooperators.
Among those is the different practices within federal districts regarding cooperators




I. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY AND THE CONTEXT OF
COOPERATION
A. Methodology
Perhaps the most useful method to study whether prosecutors
obtain truthful information from cooperators is to conduct systematic
and wide-ranging interviews with prosecutors and defense lawyers. 0
To begin this process, I interviewed former prosecutors within one
district, the Southern District of New York ("Southern District").2
After a review of the literature and case law regarding cooperation
and substantial assistance, 22 informal discussions with many lawyers
who prosecuted within the Southern District prior and subsequent to
the sentencing guidelines, and discussions with sociologists and
psychologists, I developed interview questions about the cooperation
process. Most salient among those questions are:
(1) Describe the cooperation process.
(2) How did you determine whether cooperators were telling you the
truth?
(3) To what extent were you confident that you had obtained the truth
from cooperators? What was the basis of your belief?
20. Empirical analysis is difficult for a number of reasons. One of those reasons is
the government's unwillingness to make its files available for inspection. For a more
extensive interview-based study, see Eisenstein, supra note 12, at 4-12 (discussing
research design for study of U.S. attorneys).
21. I chose the Southern District of New York for several reasons. First, I have
practiced in the Southern District of New York and have been a member of the
Criminal Justice Act Panel since 1988. Consequently, I know, by experience and
reputation, the quality of practice of many AUSAs and am familiar with the office
policies and practices of that district. Second, the Southern District of New York has
the reputation of being one of the best, if not the best district, in the country and
prides itself on a longstanding commitment to fairness, honesty, and integrity as a self-
defined "best public law office in the land." The office is perhaps the most highly
selective United States Attorney's Office and is quite independent of the United
States Justice Department. It is highly regarded by other offices, particularly for its
talent pool. The perception, however, among a significant number of government
lawyers is that over the years "the skill, the independence, the integrity and the
determination of the Southern District was exceeded, however, only by [its]
arrogance." William P. Gray, Remarks, United States Attorneys: Independent or
Unaccountable?, 1990 Bench and Bar Conference Proceedings, Feb. 1990, at 141.
This has been true, historically, even with the most highly regarded and well-
respected people occupying the role of United States Attorney. While it might be
expected that the Southern District's policies and practices regarding cooperators
reflect the reputation of the office, the extent to which this is accurate cannot be
determined without careful comparison of districts' practices.
While it would be instructive to compare cooperation practices among districts,
notably with the Eastern District of New York, interviews of defense lawyers who
practice in both the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of New York
make clear that the practices are so different that a careful comparison requires
greater study.
22. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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(4) Did you ever have an experience where you believed a cooperator
and later learned that the cooperator had lied to you? (I then
solicited information about the particular case and what was learned
from that experience.)
(5) Do you know of such experience of other assistants?
(6) To what extent do you believe that cooperators embellish the truth
to implicate others?
(7) What troubled you, if anything, about the cooperation process?
(8) What, if anything, would you change to produce more truthful
results?'
I also asked questions about the conduct of proffer sessions and
training in the United States Attorney's Office.
I limited the interviews to former assistants who began in the
Southern District no earlier than 1987 (the beginning of the
Sentencing Guidelines era) and primarily to those who maintain a
connection with the criminal justice system, either as defense lawyers,
judges, or as criminal justice policy professionals, with some notable
exceptions2 4 I also interviewed three prominent defense attorneys
who held supervisory positions in the Southern District in the 1960s
and 1970s. Their comments provided a useful comparison of
cooperation practices in the pre- and post-Guidelines eras.5
I initially selected four former Assistant United States Attorneys
23. The bias inherent in this study is the focus on cases of cooperator
untruthfulness, which, of course, skews the results toward the conclusion that the use
of cooperators is problematic. Moreover, this study does not purport to compare the
truthfulness of cooperators with that of other witnesses or defendants. Evaluation of
credibility of witnesses and defendants is a recognized problem because all witnesses
may lack precision, make mistakes, and be susceptible to suggestion or lie outright.
The reflections in this study as to inadequacies of evaluating cooperators' narratives
could be generalized, at least in part, to all potential witnesses.
Not every person interviewed was asked each question and many follow-up
questions were asked. I often asked the former AUSAs for their views on the
comments of unidentified others. Chiefs of the Criminal Division were asked
questions about the policies and practices regarding substantial assistance and about
institutional mechanisms to deal with the obvious concerns about cooperators.
24. Seventy-five percent of those former AUSAs interviewed maintain that
connection and 65% of them maintain a substantially white collar criminal defense
practice.
25. Numerous issues regarding cooperation and substantial assistance policies and
practices were explored during these interviews. Many of these issues are beyond the
scope of this Article and require further study. A critical one is the use of third party
cooperators. See United States v. Baum, 32 F. Supp2d 642, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
United States v. Doe, 870 F. Supp. 702, 702-08 (E.D. Va. 1994); Michael S. Ross,
Cooperation With Federal Authorities: Operating On the Outer Limits, Crim. Just.,
Summer 1997, at 4, 61-63. See generally Schweickert, supra note 7 (evaluating the
rules and procedures necessary to ensure the ethical propriety of the use of third-
party cooperators). Others include charge bargaining, the need for standards for
substantial assistance, and the policy that cooperators must reveal all of their criminal
conduct throughout their lives. See infra text accompanying notes 50, 51. Several of
these topics have been addressed by the Sentencing Commission and numerous
commentators. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
1999]
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("AUSAs" or "interviewees") whom I knew to be thoughtful,
thorough, and seasoned lawyers, who had each spent at least five
years in the Southern District. Each of these lawyers began working
in the Southern District in a different year.26 I interviewed each of
these attorneys and asked them for names of other former AUSAs
who were thoughtful and who had worked in different units in the
office. I also asked for names of people who they believed held a view
different from their own. I received approximately forty-five names,
many of whom were people named by more than one attorney. I then
interviewed approximately 60% of the people who appeared on more
than one list. I repeated the process with each person interviewed.2 1 I
interviewed twenty-five former AUSAs. This included most of the
Chiefs of the Criminal Division from 1990 to 1999, Chiefs and Deputy
Chiefs of various units, and "line" assistants. 8 On average, AUSAs
had worked in the Southern District for six years. I conducted fifteen
interviews of at least one hour.29 Subsequent interviews were
approximately one half hour to forty-five minutes each.
Additionally, I interviewed sixteen other defense attorneys. Some
had worked in the Southern District United States Attorney's Office
more than fifteen years ago, some were former Manhattan District
Attorneys and some had never worked within a prosecutor's office. I
selected lawyers from the following known groupings: those whose
retained cases were primarily narcotics related, a random sample of
the Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") panel of lawyers, 0 federal
26. Until 1990, the Southern District of New York hired six to eight new lawyers
each year to begin in the General Crimes Unit of the Criminal Division. Beginning in
1990, with additional federal monies for organized crime and narcotics cases, the
number of new hires for that unit expanded to approximately ten to fifteen new
lawyers per year. See Cornell W. Clayton, The Politics of Justice: The Attorney
General and the Making of Legal Policy 26-29 (1992).
27. This form of sampling is recognized in experimental psychological literature as
a key informant strategy or snowball sampling and has been used with increasing
regularity for populations that were not previously studied. See Earl Babbie, The
Practice of Social Research 268-69, 289 (5th ed. 1989); Jerome E. Jackson, Fraud
Masters: Professional Credit Card Offenders and Crime, 19 Crim. Just. Rev. 24, 33-34
(1994); Charles D. Kaplan et al., Temporal and Social Contexts of Heroin-Using
Populations: An Illustration of the Snowball Sampling Technique, 175 J. Nervous &
Mental Disease 566, 567-68 (1987).
28. A number of former AUSAs who were listed currently work for the Southern
District or the Justice Department. The policy of the Southern District does not
permit them to be interviewed. Moreover, three former AUSAs are handling matters
for the Southern District in their current practices and declined to be interviewed.
29. Tape recordings and notes of interviews are on file with the author.
30. These are court-appointed lawyers who represent indigent clients.
Approximately 85% of clients in federal court are indigent. See Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, Report to Congress on the Optimal Utilization of Judicial
Resources 74 (1998), available on The Federal Judiciary Homepage (visited Nov. 3,
1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/ optimal/toc.htm. A significant part of their CJA
practice is the defense of narcotics cases. From 1994 to 1998, approximately 39% of
cases in the Second Circuit were narcotics cases. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note
9, at 35-36 (basing information on datafiles of the U.S. Sentencing Commission for
[Vol. 68
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defenders, white collar lawyers who were not former AUSAs, and
lawyers who handle high profile cases and are highly respected by a
large segment of the defense community (and often, although not
always, by former AUSAs). These lawyers are termed "other defense
lawyers" for purposes of this Article. I asked these lawyers to discuss
their experiences with the cooperation process and the extent to
which they had experiences representing cooperating defendants who
they believed were not truthful with the government. My goal in
selecting these defense lawyers who had not been prosecutors in the
guidelines era was to discern if they had different perceptions than
those defense lawyers who had prosecuted under the guidelines about
the extent to which cooperators were truthful with the government. I
also wanted to determine if perceptions differed according to the type
of practice.
Each lawyer that I interviewed was promised anonymity to
encourage frank discussion. To the extent that the lawyers discussed
particular cases and expressed a desire to keep cases from recognition,
either by name or particular recognizable factual allegations, I agreed
to do so. Thus, where defendants are referred to throughout this
Article, fictitious names are substituted and discussion of the facts is
limited.
B. The Context of Cooperation
The results of this study are necessarily informed by a proper
understanding of the process of cooperation and the role of
cooperators in the era of mandatory minimum sentences and the
Sentencing Guidelines.31 Those Guidelines, which attempt to provide
uniformity in sentencing, are perceived to have shifted sentencing
authority from the courts to the prosecutors, most notably by
constructing a modified charge-offense based system whereby the
prosecution selects the sentencing parameters by shaping the criminal
charges.3 2 Those charging decisions and subsequent plea bargaining
decisions ultimately determine the narrow range of sentences that a
each respective year).
31. See United States. v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 787-89 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing
the impact the Sentencing Guidelines have had on the sentencing of cooperating
witnesses). For a comprehensive study of substantial assistance departures, see
Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group, supra note 10; Weinstein, Trial Judge's
Reflections, supra note 8, at 6-7 (discussing the burden the Sentencing Guidelines
place on the prison system).
32. Moreover, the Department of Justice implemented a policy that the
government must:
initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses
consistent with the defendant's conduct. Charges should not be filed simply
to exert leverage to induce a plea, nor should charges be abandoned in an
effort to arrive at a bargain that fails to reflect the seriousness of the
defendant's conduct.




One of the only significant ways in which sentencing discretion is
returned to a court is if the prosecution deems the defendant to have
provided "substantial assistance." In that case, the government
provides the court with a letter pursuant to section 5K1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines 4 which permits the court to impose a sentence
outside of the "rigid grid" of the guidelines.35 Without such a letter,
particularly in narcotics cases, defendants are subject to significant
mandatory minimum sentences and lengthy periods of incarceration. 6
Thus, there is the perception that the nature of federal criminal
practice has changed substantially with cooperation being the name of
the game.37 There is serious concern that this unregulated process
corrupts the truth because it "encourage[s] some defendants to
exaggerate or falsify information" 31 in order to obtain their 5K1.1
letter.
The stakes are significantly increased for reasons that are driven not
only by the Sentencing Guidelines, but also by mandatory minimum
sentences and the changes in enforcement patterns.3 9 The effect is to
33. See generally Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9, at 15 (finding 74.9% of federal
judges and 58.6% of chief probation officers thought that the prosecutor had the
greatest influence on the final guideline sentence); Standen, supra note 8, at 1514,
1527 nn.158 & 206 (discussing how current practices have limited the judicial
sentencing role); Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing
Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998) (discussing the factors that determine
sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines). But see James B. Bums et al., We Make
the Better Target (But The Guidelines Shifted Power From the Judiciary to Congress,
Not From the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1317, 1332-35 (1997).
34. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (1999) provides:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
35. Ming He, 94 F.3d at 788. But see Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal
Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1574, 1590-97 (1997) (stating
guidelines are not rigid).
36. The government must request that a court depart below the statutory
minimum pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), as well as request a 5K1.1 departure in
order to authorize a sentence below the statutory minimum. See Melendez v. United
States, 518 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1996).
37. See Ross, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that cooperation is one of the most
important driving forces in sentencing); Schweickert, supra note 7, at 1449.
38. Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group, supra note 10, at 43. This U.S.
Sentencing Commission report was the result of an in-depth study of the policies and
practices of the manner in which section 5K1.1 operated in jurisdictions throughout
the country. On-site interviews were conducted with district judges, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers. In addition to confirming the documented disparity in sentencing for
the same offenses, the report noted that "some suggested that the substantial
assistance process may influence or encourage some defendants to exaggerate or
falsify some information given to the government in order to get the substantial
assistance motion." Id. at 20. This observation was repeated in many districts.
Probation officers reported that "defendants abused the process by testifying often
falsely to improve their own situations." Id.
39. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 418-
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expose defendants to draconian sentences that could hardly have been
contemplated before mandatory minimum sentences and the
guidelines. Hence, there is significant pressure on a defendant to
obtain a 5K1.1 letter (including, where applicable, an 18 U.S.C.
§3553(e) request to depart).4 Moreover, the sentencing guidelines
vest the prosecutor with complete discretion as to whether the
government will seek a downward departure based upon the
defendant's substantial assistance.41 Except for limited review, this
decision is made without any accountability to the defendant or the
court.4 2
Within the Justice Department, there are few, if any, internal
standards for substantial assistance to guide the discretion of
prosecutors.43 Significantly, the Principles of Federal Prosecution do
not require a prosecutor to take into account the truthfulness,
reliability, or completeness of a defendant's testimony when making a
substantial assistance determination.m
One consequence of the Sentencing Guidelines is that the
consequences of going to trial and losing are far more severe than
under the previous system. Defendants, who exercised their right to
trial prior to the guidelines and were convicted, received somewhat
stiffer sentences than they would have had they accepted a guilty plea.
Under the guidelines, most defendants cannot afford the risk of trial
24 (1992); Richman, supra note 3, at 86. See generally Gray, supra note 21, at 123
(discussing the pros and cons of reigning in the virtually unreviewable discretion of
United States Attorneys).
40. Generally, as the level of a defendant's criminal liability increases, the more
pressure a prosecutor can apply to secure cooperation. See Richman, supra note 3, at
86 (documenting increases in sentences after the guidelines); James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521, 1536 (1981).
41. See Bums et al., supra note 33, at 1327-30 (discussing the limited role of the
court in 5K1.1 motions).
42. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 199, 212-13 (1993). Several commentators have suggested that an
administrative law model should be utilized to review substantial assistance decision
making and other aspects of prosecutorial discretion. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justic 66 Fordham L Rev. 2117, 2141-45 (1998);
Sklansky, supra note 9, at 527.
43. See Lee, From Gatekeeper, supra note 3, at 245-51 (arguing for nationwide
prosecutorial guidelines for substantial assistance motions); Maxfield & Kramer,
supra note 9, at 6-7 (documenting the lack of internal guidelines for substantial
assistance motions). Even in districts with review criteria for substantial assistance
letters, the stated policies are followed consistently in only one-half to two-thirds of
districts. See id. at 8.
44. The Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth three considerations to
determine whether a "person's cooperation may be necessary to the public interest."
These are: the importance of the case, the value of the person's cooperation to the
investigation or prosecution, and the person's relative culpability and criminal history.
The principles also suggest that a person's "background of cooperation with law
enforcement" is an important factor to be considered. See U.S. Dep't of Justice,
United States Attorney's Manual § 9-27.620 (1997); Sklansky, supra note 9, at 528-29.
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because the consequences of losing are that much more severe.45 This
disparity in consequences has significantly changed the system. 46 All
in all, the inducement to cooperate is unprecedented and enormously
powerful, particularly in homicide or drug investigations. 47
Defendants who desire to enter into the cooperation process face a
number of problems. First, they do not know what information the
government has in its possession, and substantial assistance has come
to be defined as giving the government information that it does not
already possess.48 Second, defendants are often unclear about the
government's expectations. While the government claims that it gives
5K1.1 letters based merely on assistance in an investigation, as
opposed to an agreement to testify against other defendants, the
extent to which this is accurate or verifiable is unclear.49 Third, and
perhaps of greatest significance, is that in certain districts, including
the Southern District of New York, potential cooperators are
expected to tell the government about all of their criminal conduct
throughout their lifetime as a precondition to a cooperation
agreement. If they are "signed up" by the government, cooperators
will be required, as part of their cooperation agreement, to plead
guilty to serious conduct that they reveal to the government. 0 This
45. See Ross, supra note 25, at 4; Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop
of Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the
Use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1267, 1275-76
(1997).
46. Another consequence of-the guidelines is that the disparity in sentencing for
the same conduct is hidden because individual charging decisions are made off the
record without systematic data keeping in prosecutors' offices. See Secunda, supra
note 45, at 1276.
47. See Weinstein, Regulating the Market, supra note 8, at 579-81; John C. Jeffries,
Jr. & Hon. John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of
Federal Prosecution, 46 Hastings L.J. 1095, 1119-20 (1995). The pressures to
cooperate are of longstanding concern but many argue that the guidelines have
exacerbated the existing problems.
48. See Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group, supra note 10, at 26. A
recent study of the Sentencing Commission laments that the Justice Department has
not made the necessary data available to review justification for substantial assistance
departures. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9, at 6.
49. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9, at 27 (documenting statistics of
nationwide grants of substantial assistance letters for different forms of cooperation).
Nationally, the rate of receipt of 5K1.1 departures varies dramatically by the type of
assistance rendered. In drug cases, the rates were: operating undercover (100%),
testifying (85%), verbal information only or agreement to testify (27%-47%). See
United States v. John Doe, No. 96 Cr. 1143, at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1999) (finding
that an overwhelming percentage of 5K1.1 letters are for cooperation in prosecution
of others; occasionally letters are issued solely for cooperation in an investigation).
50. The hope of the person who agrees to enter into this process is that he will
receive a 5K1.1 letter and, even though he will plead guilty to serious conduct above
and beyond that with which he is charged, the judge will understand the implicit
agreement that the sentence to be imposed should be less than the guidelines
calculation for the underlying case. For example, a defendant, who sold 50 grams of
cocaine as part of a conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, faces
a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, and depending on a number of factors,
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controversial policy results in significantly increased exposure for a
cooperating defendant. Thus, a critical factor in the defense's decision
of whether to cooperate with the government is the likelihood, in such
a circumstance, that the defendant will be able to fulfill the terms of
the cooperation agreement. Ultimately, the defendant must rely upon
judges' understanding and knowledge of the cooperation practice in
the district to insure that he will receive his intended benefit.51
Typically, the cooperation process begins early in a case because the
first person to provide the government with information about the
crime and the participation of others often receives the greater
benefit. Thus, there is often what is commonly referred to as a "race
to the station house" to obtain a cooperation agreement.52 The longer
a defendant waits to cooperate, the less likely he is to have
information that is still useful to the government. Thus, defendants
know early on from information provided by their lawyers or other
inmates, or because of previous connection to the federal criminal
justice system, that their best chance at a good sentence is to
cooperate and cooperate early. Competent defense lawyers must
discuss the option of cooperation with clients early on in the
representation. In fact, defense lawyers complain that, because of the
timing of "being the first in the door" is so crucial, they must address
including the amount of drugs involved, his role in the offense, and his prior criminal
history, a guideline range that is likely to be greater than the 10 year mandatory
minimum sentence. The defendant decides to cooperate with the government,
expecting to receive a sentence of less than 10 years. That defendant, in the course of
his meetings with the government, reveals that he participated in two homicides.
Assuming that the government agrees to provide that defendant with a cooperation
letter, the defendant will be required to plead guilty not only to the drug conspiracy
but to at least one homicide. This subjects the defendant to a life sentence. If he does
not receive the 5K1.1 letter, he now subjects himself to a longer period of
incarceration than he would have received without cooperation because of his plea to
the homicide(s).
51. A criticism of the current scheme is that recently appointed judges do not fully
appreciate the cooperation process and the extent to which it is implicit in the
agreement that the anticipated result will be below the guideline range for the original
offense. There are numerous reports of judges looking to the maximum sentence of
the additional conduct as the benchmark for the imposed sentence rather than the
guideline range of the underlying offense. This slow shift in sentencing practice
requires even greater competence by defense lawyers in advising a client about
cooperation. This phenomenon merits further study.
52. The entry of a cooperator into the criminal justice process differs by type of
case. In "white collar" (e.g., mail, wire and bank fraud, and securities violations) it is
not uncommon for a target of an investigation to secure the services of a lawyer, and
begin the cooperation process to ward off an indictment. In the "street crime" (drugs,
robberies, homicides) context, defendants are typically indicted by a grand jury,
obtain the services of a lawyer and begin the cooperation dance with the government.
Typically, the first cooperator "in the door" of the U.S. Attorney's Office who has
information about the other co-defendants has potential to receive great benefit. See
Hughes, supra note 3, at 41. In some instances, cooperation begins by the agents'
discussions with a defendant or target of prosecution prior to the time that the
prosecutor meets the cooperator.
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the possibility of cooperation even before they have an opportunity to
fully review and investigate the facts of the case or to develop an
attorney-client relationship.53
Once a defendant decides to enter the cooperation process, the
defendant and her lawyer meet with government counsel and,
typically, the agents involved in the case. The initial debriefing gives
the government a sense of whether the cooperator has useful
information.54 Depending upon the importance and strength of the
case, the government may decide to meet with a defendant again even
where it believes that the defendant has utterly lied. Typically, there
are a number of debriefing sessions prior to the government making a
decision that the defendant should be signed up for a cooperation
agreement.55
Once a cooperator obtains an agreement, his role varies by the
nature of the case. In most cases, the cooperator is expected to agree
to testify and, if necessary, will spend considerable time with the
assistant handling the case. Subsequent to that testimony, the
government will determine whether the cooperator has met the
conditions set forth in his cooperation agreement, and, if so, will send
a 5K1.1 letter to the court for sentencing.56
II. BASES FOR PROSECUTORS' BELIEFS IN COOPERATOR
TRUTHFULNESS
In this part, I will discuss the results of the interviews that I
conducted.57 First, I will explore the overall belief held by prosecutors
53. The difficulties and nuances of defense lawyer counseling are beyond the
scope of this Article. The Sentencing Guidelines have created heightened
requirements for effective assistance of counsel and legislative funding for defense
counsel is far short of that necessary to adequately address the need for such essential
services. See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Judicial Conference of the
United States on the Federal Defender Program (1993), reprinted in 53 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2003, 2008 (Apr. 14, 1993); Janet Reno, Remarks of the Attorney General of
the United States, Six Building Blocks for Indigent Defense (Feb. 25, 1999), in The
Champion, Apr. 1999, at 28 (stating that the disparity of resources has a corrosive
effect on the ability of poor defendants to secure effective representation.).
54. Often, particularly in white collar cases, there is substantial negotiation and
agreement about the appropriate guideline range from which calculations begin prior
to the defendant's first meeting with the government. See Kenneth Mann, Defending
White Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work 14-15 (1985); Hughes, supra
note 3, at 2.
55. This decision differs by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions sign up far more
potential cooperators than those to whom they ultimately give 5K1.1 letters. See
Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 9, at 9-10. In the Southern District, the policy is not
to sign up a cooperator unless there is a belief that the person will, in fact, get the
letter. In the Southern District, the rate of cooperators signed up who were
ultimately given 5K1.1 letters was at least 80%.
56. A study of government compliance with cooperation agreements is beyond
the scope of this Article.
57. Throughout the remainder of the Article, quotations from the 25 anonymous
interviews I conducted with former AUSAs will be identified by their interview
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that safeguards exist to protect against the use of false testimony from
cooperators in most cases. Then, I will discuss the factors that I found
lead prosecutors to believe, sometimes erroneously, in cooperator
truthfulness.
A. Prosecutors' Beliefs Regarding Cooperator Truthfidness
The former AUSAs readily acknowledged their concern that the
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing have
heightened the risks and dangers of reliance upon information from
cooperators. 8
There is a desperation on the part of defense lawyers to get 5K's.
There is too much pressure because of mandatory minimums." The
attitude of defendants is by dam, I am going to be signed up.60 The
problem comes about because the system effectively says that once
you have identified criminal conduct, the right result is the most
severe punishment.61
While the former AUSAs believe that "by and large" prosecutors
have obtained truthful information from cooperators, they recognize
that there is no mechanism to insure that this is fact. Former AUSAs
reported that they would not put a witness on the stand whom they
did not believe, but readily admitted that, in some instances, they
simply could not determine if the cooperator had told the truth. As a
general proposition, most former AUSAs were quick to acknowledge:
You never really know if a person has told the truth. Maybe there's
a lot more lying than one suspects. You really do not know the
extent of a lie until you start preparing for trial.'
number [hereinafter 1-1-1-25]. Quotations from the 16 anonymous interviews I
conducted with other defense attorneys will be identified by their interview number
as well [hereinafter D-1-D-161. All interviews are on file with author. In addition,
many of the quotes by AUSAs and other defense attorneys will be in block quote
format for stylistic purposes.
58. The former AUSAs necessarily reflect their views of how they operated in the
role of prosecutor with the wisdom of hindsight and years of additional seasoning. All
of them, however, made clear that the risks and dangers of reliance upon cooperators
was a concern from the time they entered the prosecutor's office. Their perspectives
offered throughout this Article necessarily are colored by that hindsight and a change
in role.
59. 1-8, supra note 57; see I-11, supra note 57; 1-15, supra note 57.
60. 1-8, supra note 57.
61. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-2, supra note 57. The vast number of interviewees
(but not the majority of the former Chiefs of the Criminal Division) are disturbed by
the office's policy that a cooperator must reveal all of his criminal conduct throughout
his life and enter a guilty plea as to serious conduct revealed. Many interviewees
noted that the policy encourages prosecutors to "turn a blind eye" to a cooperator's
lies about past conduct because the assistant simply "does not want to hear it." 1-3,
supra note 57; see 1-5, supra note 57. "The system forces you to be a rule breaker." I-
3, supra note 57. This is an issue in need of further study.
62. 1-9, supra note 57.
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Moreover, the broader the investigation, the "greater likelihood of
abuse because there is more area for shaping events." 63
Despite these concerns, the overall sense of former AUSAs is that
the system "works" to produce truthful information from cooperators.
Seventy-five percent of the former AUSAs believed that proper
investigation and thorough preparation insures that the government
obtains truthful information from cooperators. This belief is premised
upon the practice of the United States Attorney's Office in the
Southern District of corroborating all salient facts.64 Virtually all
former AUSAs emphasized corroboration as the key factor in
assuring cooperator truthfulness.
A thorough command of the facts is the only safeguard against a
lying cooperator.6
5
A former chief emphasized:
We are never casual about whether a cooperator is telling the
truth. We did not make distinctions between big and little things.6
We do a great deal of due diligence. 7
Two former chiefs reflected that there were only a handful of
incidents of someone making up facts to implicate innocent people.6
The Southern District took immediate action in those cases.
When the former AUSAs were asked to recount situations where
they learned that cooperators had lied, approximately half of those
interviewed recounted instances that raise questions as to whether the
corroboration rationale is sufficient assurance that convictions are
based on truthful information from cooperators. These questions
concern the nature of what constitutes corroboration and the extent to
which it can be secured, particularly in categories of cases where
former AUSAs believe that sufficient corroboration does not exist for
some part of, or a good deal of, a cooperator's information. These
include violent gang and some organized crime cases, small narcotics
cases, money laundering and larger narcotics cases. Moreover, the
interviews revealed many other factors that lead to false beliefs in
cooperator truthfulness. These additional factors are: (1) lack of
63. 1-16, supra note 57.
64. Many AUSAs expressed the view that embellished testimony or false
confessions are primarily problems in state courts where there are fewer investigatory
resources and where case preparation is not perceived to be as thorough. One of the
ironies of this view is that New York state law does not permit a conviction to be
sustained solely on the basis of accomplice testimony. While the state system has
documented weaknesses, see City of New York, Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police
Department, Commission Report, July 1994, the cooperator credibility issue does not
appear to exist primarily in the state system.
65. 1-2, supra note 57.
66. I-11, supra note 57.
67. 1-25, supra note 57.
68. 1-6, supra note 57; see I-11, supra note 57.
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proper investigation, (2) insufficient evidence of guilt, (3) misplaced
trust in cooperators, (4) rigid theory of the case, (5) cultural barriers,
(6) attitudes of individual AUSAs, (7) lack of experience of the
AUSA, and (8) conduct of the proffer sessions.
The majority of cases in which cooperators were not truthful
involved lies about matters that the prosecution deemed to be
"collateral" to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Most of the
lies were exposed through cross-examination.19 In many of those
instances, in which former AUSAs eventually learned that a
cooperator had lied, the former AUSAs reported that they had been
somewhat suspicious of the cooperator's statements during the
cooperation process. 0
This anecdotal method of examining cooperator lies does not
necessarily demonstrate a widespread problem in reliance upon
cooperators.7 1  Nevertheless, the nature of the reported cases,
particularly in a district which is highly regarded for its thorough
practice, suggests the need for an examination of several practices and
policies within United States Attorney's offices.'
While these cases do not suggest that cooperators necessarily
implicate people innocent of criminal activity, they do imply that some
cooperators have embellished the facts, including the extent of
culpability of defendants. The anecdotes and information provided by
the other defense lawyers interviewed supports this conclusion,
These accounts point to a need to study changes in the cooperation
process particularly for certain categories of cases.
69. Some interviewees suggest that the adversary system, with it emphasis on
cross-examination, is a sufficient check to insure that our "imperfect system" is not
"flawed." 1-11, supra note 57. However, because 97% of cases are resolved by plea
bargaining, however, cross examination cannot operate as a check in more than 3% of
cases.
70. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-16, supra note 57.
71. The reported instances demonstrate that the lies were discovered randomly or
through cross examination. This could indicate that the problem is more significant
than previously recognized. At a minimum, these instances demonstrate that the
federal criminal justice system does not have a grasp on the magnitude of the
problem.
72. Chiefs of the Criminal Division appear to have greater confidence that the
risks of cooperator lying are not realized than do line assistants, deputy chiefs of
bureaus, and bureau chiefs.
73. One of the few significant differences between the incidents reported by
former AUSAs and other defense lawyers is that a greater percentage of other
defense lawyers have had experiences with cooperator embellishment. One defense
lawyer, succinctly expressing the views of others, said, "Cooperators do what cops do:
they round out the rough edges .... A portion is true, but how much is true?
Cooperators typically add information to round out the story." D-1 1, supra note 57.
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B. Bases for Prosecutors' False Beliefs in Cooperator Truthfulness
1. Insufficient Corroboration
Former AUSAs differed by orientation and belief system as to
whether they could ever learn the full truth74 from a cooperator.
Nevertheless, there was agreement that, to the extent that they
believed that cooperators provided truthful information, their belief
was based upon the fact that the cooperators' facts were "consistent
with the other information we had."75
When questioned as to the nature of the "other information," the
results differed by the type of case. In reference to the 39% of cases
that were narcotics prosecutions in the Southern District, former
AUSAs pointed to the fact that in recent years, the office had
prosecuted a number of large narcotics conspiracies where the
evidence typically consisted of many hours of recorded conversations,
wiretaps, surveillance by agents, documents, fruits of the crime (drugs
and money), and the evidence from confidential informants. The
corroboration was deemed significant.
We look to documentary evidence, tapes, wiretaps, surveillance. We
would ask ourselves does it make sense and we would use those
credibility measures that everyone uses. Is it logical, does it fit in to
what I know to be true?76
In white collar cases, there are "reams of paper"'  constituting a
great deal of documentary evidence from which the prosecutor can
74. There is an extensive literature on the nature of truth and the adversary
system as a vehicle for discovering the truth. See generally Marvin E. Frankel,
Partisan Justice (1980) (describing how law schools teach students to sacrifice
objective truth in favor of strategy maneuvers to benefit clients); Thomas S. Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970) (arguing that all new factual and
theoretical discoveries in science result in scientific revolution); David Luban,
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988) (calling for lawyers to adopt a moral
activism model in place of the traditional role morality model); Karl R. Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963) (arguing
that knowledge advances through the adversarial argument of theories and challenges
to them); Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 Yale L.J. 238 (1950)
(contrasting rigid logical propositions with the creativity of lawyers' approach to the
truth).
75. 1-22, supra note 57. Seventy-five percent expressed the belief that they
obtained most of the truth and "could get to the bottom of things," 1-16, supra note
57, although three assistants reported that it is most difficult to get cooperators to
admit to violent acts. Two reported that they were never sure that cooperators told
the truth about ill-gotten gains.
You can get a guy to tell you about his drug crimes and homicides, but it is
harder to get them to tell you about the loot they had stored away.... The
money, the jewelry.
1-8, supra note 57; see 1-16, supra note 57.
76. 1-23, supra note 57.
77. 1-8, supra note 57.
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determine whether the cooperator was truthful. Virtually all of those
interviewed believed that most white collar cases presented the least
danger of untruthful testimony for this very reason.78
For example, most former AUSAs said that in major fraud and
large narcotics cases, the extent of corroboration makes
embellishment of facts by cooperators highly unlikely. "We often had
cross-corroboration. '79 Some former AUSAs, however, dispute the
notion that sufficient corroboration exists for all crucial facts elicited
from cooperators even in such well-investigated cases.
There were still many open areas in which cooperators could shade
or embellish the truth.' There is often ambiguity to tape recorded
conversations. The wiretaps are like a table of contents of a book.
Even if it's good, it's coded and you need people to decipher the
code.s'
A former AUSA recounted an occasion where the government
believed that the term "laundry" used throughout conversations was a
reference to drugs. The government ultimately learned that "laundry
was just laundry."'
Similarly, the existence of voluminous records in bank fraud cases is
not necessarily complete corroboration of a cooperator's testimony.
Often the essence of the charge is what the CEO [chief executive
officer] or CFO [chief financial officer] knew and when they knew it.
The accountant is the cooperating witness and explains what the
CEO knew. Where's the corroboration for that? Especially in
business where there's volumes of information going in and out,
asking someone for their recall about what occurred three months
ago or three years ago is not great assurance that they will get it
right.83
As these interviews suggest, information often cannot be
corroborated.
You can never be 100% sure unless you have tape recordings of
conversations. The problem comes in because the "filler" to fully
tell the story of what happened comes from the cooperator's mouth
and you just do not have corroboration for it. I always take it all
78. Former AUSAs believed that they could more readily assess the truthfulness
of cooperators in the white collar settings because the "cultural and class boundaries
are easier to penetrate than for others accused of crime." 1-25, supra note 57.
Additionally, the "significance of the power you have goes further in the white collar
context." Id.
79. 1-21, supra note 57; See 1-23, supra note 57. In large-scale cases (conspiracies
or money laundering over a period of years), prosecutors often view cooperation as
the "essential" corroboration of the general course of conduct. The corroboration of
the individual transactions is deemed less significant.
80. 1-15, supra note 57; See 1-18, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note 57.





with a grain of salt until I see the corroboration. Rarely can you
corroborate every fact. For instance, a cooperator can tell you
about a telephone conversation he had with a defendant. When you
ask for the date, the telephone records establish that they did,
indeed, have a conversation on that date. So that's the
corroboration for the substance of the conversation. You have no
independent way to know the substance of the conversation. It's a
leap, but you trust your judgment.'
And of course, "the black hole of corroboration is the time that
cooperators and agents spend alone."'85
Despite the prosecution's emphasis on corroboration as the
assurance for cooperator truthfulness, nearly half of the former
AUSAs were troubled by what constitutes corroboration in some
cases.
You have to understand the slipperiness of fact in these cases. In
both white collar cases and drugs, the sentencing range is calculated
based upon the amount of money or drugs involved. The numbers
can be fictitious. When the paper says "Jose 6" it can be 6 kilos
total, but if the cooperator says 6 kilos a year for five years, that's
what it is. The agent will testify that in his expert opinion, its 6 per
year for 5 years. Now we have 30K and the prosecution considers it
corroborated because the paper says "Jose 6. ,86
Other problematic corroboration is referred to as "oak tree" or
"esoteric" corroboration. A former AUSA said:
A homicide occurred. Our cooperator comes in and tells us that the
guy was killed by the oak tree. We check and determine that there
is an oak tree at the scene. That constitutes our corroboration. It
may be fine in some cases, but how do you know? You look at all of
the factors, you're working with good agents and you come to trust
your case, but it's still not what I think of as real corroboration. 87
Where there is no independent verification or method to
corroborate the cooperator's information, a prosecutor might be
suspicious but is likely to "trust her own judgment" about the
truthfulness of the information. Words of caution were expressed
because:
A significant problem is that your view of the evidence is often
shaped by the first cooperator in the door, the confidential
informant, and by the agent. When the cooperators come in, there
is a predetermined view of the facts that shapes the manner in which
84. 1-17, supra note 57; See I-1, supra note 57; 1-2, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note
57; 1-20, supra note 57; 1-21, supra note 57; 1-23, supra note 57.
85. 1-10, supra note 57.
86. 1-7, supra note 57.
87. 1-3, supra note 57; See 1-13, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note 57.
[Vol. 68
COOPERATORS AND PROSECUTORS
the credibility of the cooperator is assessed.'
There are two categories of cases that do not lend themselves to
adequate corroboration. One is the "typical buy and bust" narcotics
case wherein a confidential informant ("CI") who is working with
agents sets up a drug deal with several other people.s9
These cases are not very well investigated. Neither the prosecutor
nor the agents have a lot invested in the case so they do not know a
lot of facts.' Often there is little corroboration. There might be
minimal surveillance and maybe a few tape recordings but our cases
are developed through the cooperators and their recitation of facts.
Often, in DEA, you have agents who do little or no follow up so
when a cooperator comes and begins to give you information outside
of the particular incident, you have no clue if what he says is true.
91
The typical scenario is that a CI is introduced to defendant 1.
Defendant 1 hooks up the CI with defendant 2 who, in turn, brings
defendant 3 into the scene. Defendant 3 does not say much but he
shows up carrying something. Defendant 1 is your strongest case.
Defendant 2 says that defendant 1 suckered him in and defendant 3
says he is merely present. You flip defendant 1. [He cooperates with
the government]. This is an area where it is difficult to do good
surveillance so essentially you have nothing on defendant 3.
Defendant 1 gives you some information about defendant 3's
knowledge of the deal and, after some questions, you tend to go with
it.,,92
In these small drugs cases, there are relatively few meetings with
the cooperator before we sign them up.93
Maybe there are two to three sessions before trial preparation and
then, depending on how nervous the assistant is, anywhere from one
to six sessions to prepare them for trial. 4
88. 1-19, supra note 57.
89. Most prosecutors distinguish informants from cooperators and believe that
informants have even greater incentives to lie than cooperators because, not only are
they "working off" cases, but their entire livelihood is dependent on the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
A cooperator is one whose relationship is governed by his agreement with the
United States Attorney's Office while an informant's primary relationship is with law
enforcement agencies. Problems with informants are distinct from those of
cooperators and are beyond the scope of this Article.
90. 1-13 (Deputy Chief of Criminal Division), supra note 57. The same notion was
reported by two chiefs of narcotics and many line assistants, virtually all of whom
began work in the criminal division in General Crimes where these minor drug cases
are prosecuted. Most chiefs of the Criminal Division, while noting that minor drug
cases might present such problems, emphasized the extent to which the office
prosecutes only cases where there is sufficient corroboration to ensure that the parties
are indeed guilty.
91. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-13, supra note 57; 1-15, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note
57.
92. 1-8, supra note 57.
93. 1-13, supra note 57.
94. 1-20, supra note 57.
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The lack of corroboration in these small drug cases is compounded
by the fact that some prosecutors become "lazy and sloppy" in
obtaining and evaluating the corroboration:
A brick of powder convicts on its own and unless you have a good
agent who is engaged in the case, sometimes you do not spend
sufficient time on it. There often is little if any corroboration for the
testimony apart from the drugs themselves. It is not that the people are
not guilty of something, but I was never confident about what they said
occurred in the apartment.95
Despite this comment, the former AUSA, who made this statement,
could not recall a case wherein he believed that the cooperator had
lied about the drug transaction but he acknowledged the risk.
Another problem in the small cases is:
that the least experienced people have the most power because of
mandatory minimums. They talk about the awesome power when you
start and then you are thrown into situations with poorly investigated
crimes, where the biggest surprise is the amount of time you spent with
criminals. You spend most of your time with cooperators. It's
bizarre.9 6
The most troublesome prosecutions are the violent gang cases
because they are "all based on cooperators."'  These are deemed
"historical cases" because virtually all of the evidence concerns acts
that occurred in the past, often the distant past, for which there is only
"one rat after another."98
In one case, the cooperator was like an encyclopedia of detail. We
had no independent eyewitnesses, no surveillance or tape recordings
and no forensic or documentary evidence. There's hardly even
ballistics evidence. The cases are all built upon what cooperators
tell us. We did not have a clue as to whether he was telling the truth
but the amount of detail alone led us to believe him. I could see the
agent sit there with his mouth agape.... Violent crimes are the Wild
West. Our rule of thumb was that you had to have two witnesses
who say the same thing who have not had the opportunity to
collaborate. That was the corroboration. 99
In these historical cases,
the memory problem is significant. There were a dozen murders
95. 1-19, supra note 57; see I-1, supra note 57; 1-2, supra note 57; 1-3, supra note 57;
1-13, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note 57.
96. 1-3, supra note 57.
97. 1-18, supra note 57.
98. Some of these cases come from state courts where prosecution has been
declined, often because New York State has the requirement that accomplice
testimony must be corroborated and there is little, if any, corroboration. See supra
note 61. Not only does federalization of these cases increase penalties significantly,
but it is easier to convict defendants because there is no corroboration requirement.
99. 1-15, supra note 57.
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some years ago. You are now asking a cooperator whether Little
Johnny was present at the murder of Big Tony. He thinks and then
says yes. He does not seem sure and you give him the spiel about
how you only want the truth. By the time he's finished, he has told
the detective and the grand jury that Little Johnny was definitely
there. Little Johnny is indicted and there is no information except
other cooperators to corroborate his involvement. It may just be
faulty memory °00
There are two other frequent problems in violent gang and some
organized crime cases. The first is the false confession issue.101
[It] is a counterintuitive one: a cooperator puts himself into a
situation where he was not present. In one case, a cooperator put
himself into a murder. Initially, we did not believe that a person
would put themselves in such jeopardy if it was not true. Later we
learned about several issues. First, is the hearsay problem. The
cooperator learned about the murder from the street and wanted to
make himself of value to us. He knew we need[ed] direct
information .... It is a dangerous cooperator who wants to help the
prosecutor .... This happened a couple of times. It is drummed into
defendants at the MCC (jail) that you have got to have good
information for the government.1- This happens enough that
people should be worried about it.1 3
The second problem is the very subtle manner in which evidence
can change.
100. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-8, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note
57.
101. Prosecutors are loathe to believe that people falsely confess. See Mark
Hansen, Untrue Confessions, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 51, 52 (quoting Joshua Marquis,
Oregon District Attorney for Clatsop County). The expanding literature on false
confessions demonstrates that the techniques used by law enforcement to convince
the guilty to confess sometimes work equally well to compel innocent people to
confess to crimes they did not commit. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L & Criminology 429,
444-60 (1998) (documenting 60 cases of false confessions). While debriefing a
cooperator is significantly different from interrogating a suspect at a police station,
many of the factors that give rise to false confessions (notably lack of sufficient
training) are present in debriefings. See i at 440-44; Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A.
Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Deny.
U. L. Rev. 979, 997 (1997).
102. As a defense lawyer noted:
The jailhouse talk is all about 5K1.1 and criminal defendants, upon meeting
their court appointed lawyers, want to discuss cooperation.
D-16, supra note 57.
If you even mention going to trial with some clients, they think you're a
terrible lawyer because they believe that their only chance for a good deal is
to cooperate.
D-13, supra note 57.
103. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-8, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note
57.
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You have a group of gang members who have been involved in a
number of homicides over the years. A number of them are
cooperating. One cooperator says that there were six guys at one
homicide. You do not know if Little John was at the scene and
participated in it. You ask them. Three guys remember that Little
John was there. Two say I don't know. One of the cooperators
might begin to say that maybe Little John was there. He thinks. By
the time you get to trial, he testifies that Little John was there. He
believes it. If ou focus enough on Little John, they certainly are
going to say it.'
2. Lack of Investigation
Despite the stated emphasis on corroboration of all facts, there
were numerous instances where facts were not uncovered due to lack
of investigation.105 The most common example cited was the former
AUSAs' failure to discover that a cooperator had lied about his tax
returns. Four former AUSAs reported that, despite extensive trial
preparation, they did not uncover the failure to file tax returns or
lying on tax returns.1" In each of these cases, the former AUSAs
either inherited the case from another assistant shortly before trial or
did not review the records sufficientlyy 7 In most of these cases, the
lies were exposed during cross-examination by well-prepared defense
counsel. Former AUSAs believed that the lies were more likely to be
uncovered with continuity of personnel on these cases.'8
In one case, the cooperator was the secretary of a union whose
officers were charged with embezzling. Despite extensive trial
preparation of the secretary, the former AUSA had "no inkling" that
she was an embezzler herself. The cross-examination "blew up" when
the defense attorneys established that the secretary had embezzled
from a different office account than the one at issue. The former
AUSA had neglected to review all of the records. The secretary
subsequently pled guilty to a misdemeanor for the lies. °9
Another former AUSA reported that in her first trial, a small
104. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-8, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note
57; 1-24, supra note 57.
105. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-15, supra note 57; 1-17, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note
57.
106. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-15, supra note 57; 1-17, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note
57. Interviewees were skeptical about the extent to which cooperators who lie about
such matters are prosecuted or have their cooperation agreements "ripped up." 1-3,
supra note 57; see 1-16, supra note 57; 1-17, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note 57; 1-24,
supra note 57; D-1, supra note 57; D-2, supra note 57; D-3, supra note 57; D-4, supra
note 57. The government can, of course, punish the cooperator by noting his lack of
candor in a 5K1.1 letter.
107. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-17, supra note 57.
108. The former assistant points to necessity of liberal discovery rules to insure that
such lies will be uncovered.
109. 1-3, supra note 57.
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narcotics case to which she was assigned two weeks before it began, a
cooperator had lied to her about the extent of his education. He
claimed that he had graduated from college which was untrue. She
said:
I made the mistake of a new prosecutor. I believed him because I
could not figure out a reason why he would lie about that. I though
it was just background and my focus was on the event. Next time I
would call the university. A more seasoned prosecutor would be
more questioning."0
In a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")
case involving homicides, a lack of thorough investigation led a former
AUSA to be convinced by cooperator "A" that the murderers had
called him subsequent to the event and asked for his help in
constructing an alibi. Cooperator "A" claimed that he had helped
them do so and that they had dropped the gun off at his apartment.
"A" produced the murder weapon, a factor that led the prosecutor to
believe he was truthful. During the course of the case, one of the
defendants "flipped" (cooperated with the government) and told
prosecutors that cooperator "A" was actually the electronic lookout
for the murder. It was not until cooperator "A" testified in a
subsequent case that the prosecutor began to suspect that he was in
fact the electronic lookout in the homicide. Had the prosecutor issued
a search warrant for the cooperator's apartment, he would have
discovered the physical evidence of radio specifications that would
have proved that the cooperator had lied and was, in fact, the
electronic lookout."' There were repeated instances of similar failures
to adequately investigate cases."
3. Insufficient Evidence
Another concern is the extent to which cases are prosecuted on
"thin evidence." While most Southern District cases have significant
evidence against defendants, there are instances where the
government decides that, on balance, due to a number of factors, most
notably the seriousness of the crime, a case should be prosecuted
110. 1-17, supra note 57. One of the problems is the extent to which young
prosecutors are permitted to make judgments about the truthfulness of cooperators
with little oversight. While there has been more supervision since 1991, 1-5, supra
note 57, see 1-18, supra note 57, "almost always the supervisor knew the case less well
than the assistant so they relied upon your recitation of facts and your judgment." 1-5,
supra note 57. Inevitably, the line assistant is left to make the critical judgments
about cooperators.
111. 1-15, supra note 57. Information is unavailable as to whether the cooperator
was prosecuted for perjury, lost his cooperation agreement or whether the defendant
in the first case was notified of the cooperator's lie.
112. 1-16, supra note 57; see 1-18, supra note 57; 1-20, supra note 57; 1-21, supra note
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despite the lack of significant evidence.113 Thus, in a case that "still
plagues" a former assistant, a defendant was charged with the robbery
and murder of a postal worker after a lengthy investigation even
though there was no percipient witness to the homicide and the
government thought it could only prove a case against a person whose
automobile was found at the scene.
Careful examination of telephone records led the prosecution to
believe that four people had committed the murder but there was
insufficient proof of their guilt. The Postal Inspector posted a reward
for any information leading to the killers. A man, HU, came forward
and convinced the prosecutors that he had attended a party where he
heard these four plan the robbery and murder. After extensive
questioning of the cooperator, the prosecutor signed him up for a
cooperation agreement. While recognizing that this was a thin case,
the decision was that either the prosecution must go forward because
of the gravity of the offense or the case should be dismissed. They
decided to proceed. The defense lawyer proved that the cooperator
had lied during cross examination when he was able to establish
through independent witnesses that the cooperator had not attended
the party where he claimed to have heard the four people plan the
homicide. 14 The defendant was acquitted and the cooperator was
later prosecuted for perjury."5
The interviews revealed other examples of cases where former
AUSAs report that they made "errors in judgment." In one case, a
former AUSA called two cooperators whose stories were inconsistent
with each other to testify and neither story "matched up" to the
surveillance:
My sense was that one of the cooperator's stories kept changing. He
still minimized his role on the stand. Did he lie? It's hard to say....
I was uncomfortable throughout the entire trial.' 6
4. Trust of Cooperators
Another reason that former AUSAs report that they mistakenly
relied upon cooperators is that they trusted their cooperators and
113. There is no suggestion that cases are prosecuted where the government is
uncertain of the defendant's guilt.
114. The prosecution later learned that the cooperator had obtained the
information by hearsay.
115. While some might suggest that the acquittal is proof that the criminal justice
system functions effectively, this former AUSA concludes that independent
corroboration of facts should be a legal requirement and that the federal system
should consider adopting the rules of the New York state system for corroboration.
He also believes that in close cases, where the evidence is thin, the case should be
reviewed by numerous supervisors in the office to determine whether or not to
proceed.
116. 1-21, supra note 57.
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believed that they could "tell" who was truthful. Many reported that
truthfulness was a "matter of common sense."" 7 This notion was
reported to be problematic by others who explained:
By definition cooperators are manipulative. You must create an
arms length relationship. You both want something. You want the
information and he wants the benefit. It is easy to be
manipulated. 18
Former AUSAs report difficulty assessing the extent to which
subtle manipulation works:
Your view of the cooperator changes during the debriefing process
and they are now on the team. The incentives to please you are
great and you might not even recognize them because you have
come to develop what you believe to be a trusting relationship with
your cooperator." 9  It is not that he thinks he's fabricating
information. He's just eager to please.12
Moreover, when assistants come to trust the cooperator they will
often fail to corroborate all facts:
If I worked with a cooperator and came to trust him and I
corroborated six of the eight major facts he told me, I would tend to
believe the two uncorroborated ones and use those at trial. I would
not always try to corroborate those additional two facts. I've gotten
burned by such an approach. 21
We learn that you must try to corroborate every fact, but the daily
pressures of cases and your belief that this guy you've gotten to
know pretty well is truthful leads you not to spend the extra time.12
This trust of the cooperator is particularly problematic for young
assistants who have little seasoning to properly evaluate the
significance of a lie that they deem to be "collateral" to the issues in
the case.m In addition to numerous reports of informant lies about
tax returns, 24 some AUSAs reported stories of more significant
117. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-9, supra note 57; 1-20, supra note 57; 1-21, supra note
57.
118. 1-8, supra note 57.
119. 1-10.
120. 1-9, supra note 57.
121. 1-17, supra note 57.
122. 1-13, supra note 57.
123. Many former AUSAs recounted lies that they deemed collateral to the issues
in the case and not related to credibility. When asked how they could determine
whether the small lie reflected a more significant credibility problem, former AUSAs
acknowledged that, on hindsight, the lie "could have been part of a pattern of little
lies," 1-23, supra note 57, which might have had bearing on the underlying facts of the
case. They did not believe this when the case was prosecuted because the essential
facts of the crime were corroborated by other evidence.
124. Former AUSAs who did not report confronting a lying cooperator typically
had at least one experience with a lying informant. Often the lies concerned tax
returns. Most former AUSAs did not believe that an informant who lied on his tax
returns had lied to them about the facts of the crime. While they disclose this
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cooperator lies:
I got duped once by a middle aged lady who seemed so prim and
proper. She was a drug courier and claimed this was the only time
she ever did so. She blew up on cross examination. She was a big
liar. She had done it many times before. As I gained seasoning, I
learned that it is virtually always true that anyone who did it once
did it before.'25
A related problem is the development of a trusting relationship
with a cooperator, known by prosecutors as "falling in love with your
rat. "126
You are not supposed to, of course. You are trained to maintain
your objectivity. But you spend time with this guy, you get to know
him and his family. You like him. You believe that he has come
clean. His cooperation is the first step toward a new life. Hopefully,
the assistant has a skeptical mind set, but the reality is that the
cooperator's information often becomes your mind set. Typically,
he won't lie to you on big things. It's the little things. It's a
phenomenon and the danger is that because you feel all warm and
fuzzy about your cooperator, you come to believe that you do not
have to spend much time or energy investigating the case and you
don't. Once you become chummy with your cooperator, there is a
real danger that you lose your objectivity. 127
For example:
You learn early from your cooperator that Little Johnny is a
pathological liar. You proceed with that assumption and interview a
number of people. You become close to your cooperator. You
think you are maintaining some objectivity but you like the guy.
You know him, his family, the hardship he's gone through. You've
essentially asked the guy to betray everyone he knows. Maybe he's
cut himself off from his family, he's lost his collegial environment.
He's vilified in his world. The politics of living in that neighborhood'
is that everyone knows everyone. You talk to a lot of people about
Johnny about whether Johnny was the sixth person at the murder
scene. Johnny swears that he was not there. If you just do not
know, if there are two versions, you go with your cooperator. 28
information to the defense and spend hours with the informant questioning him about
his lies, the former AUSAs report that, typically, they do not conclude that the
cooperator is lying about the crime.
The prevalence of reported lies about income tax returns may be solely the
consequence of a particular CI who was used widely as a witness in the early 1990s.
That experience led to a greater degree of attention to income tax returns of
informants and cooperators. Thus, this particular concern may not be as relevant
today.
125. 1-3, supra note 57.
126. 1-13, supra note 57.
127. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-3, supra note 57; 1-5, supra note 57; 1-8, supra note 57;
1-13, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note 57.
128. 1-15, supra note 57.
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The relationship between the prosecutor and the agent who
investigated the case has also resulted in assistants acting in a less than
diligent fashion.m
You are a young assistant. The agent is experienced. He's good.
He lets it be known that he thinks you are pushing too much to get
information. Particularly where informants are involved, the agents
do not want to give up information too quickly. He's their guy. So
you are too quick to try to please the agent. It's subtle. But I have
heard assistants say the agent wants a RICO as the justification for
filing a case as such.'m
Several former AUSAs noted that if you are committed to getting
the absolute truth, you often have tension with various agencies.3 1
5. Rigid Theory of Guilt
There are a number of reported instances where the prosecution's
focus on convicting a person it believes to be guilty has led to
questionable judgments about cooperators. While AUSAs pride
themselves on their integrity, good judgment, and common sense,
some former AUSAs and other defense lawyers report instances of
rigidity.
Prosecutors are convinced they have the guilty guy, then they go
about seeking to convict and do not carefully look at things that are
funny about their case.132
Prosecutors are, nevertheless, advocates. They get wedded to
their theory and things inconsistent with their theory are ignored. 3
As another interviewee explained "If you only have a hammer,
everything looks like a nail."1  Moreover:
many people do not want to uncover facts that are inconsistent with
their theory of the case. Life is pretty messy, and it is rare that
anything goes from point A to point B without lots of messy details
129. Of greater concern is the influence that agents have over cooperators when
the AUSA is not present. "You have to rely upon agents to supervise cooperators
and that brings a certain level of skepticism." 1-4, supra note 57.
130. 1-16, supra note 57; see D-9, supra note 57. AUSAs express admiration for the
agents.
Narcotics is like cops and robbers. It's exciting. It's like PacMan. 1-3. When
you go home at night they work in dangerous situations. You have to
admire these guys. They deserve a lot of deference.
1-10, supra note 57.
131. I-1, supra note 57; see 1-2, supra note 57; 1-16, supra note 57.
132. D-3, supra note 57.
133. 1-23, supra note 57. There is skepticism as to whether, because of the
prosecutor's role as an advocate, he is capable of impartiality in his adjudicative role
of assessing cooperator reliability. See Gershman, supra note 39, at 416; Lynch, supra
note 42, at 2141 (arguing that the prosecutor plays a quasi-judicial role in the current
system and that an administrative approach should be explored).
134. 1-15, supra note 57 (attributing the quote to Abraham Maslow).
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on the way. If things sound clear, I always think that you're not
getting the full story. The problem is that additional probing makes
the case more complicated and sometimes more difficult to prevail
so people ignore such facts. You must make a commitment to
getting the truth in and of itself.135
A recent example was noted by another former AUSA who had
represented a defendant in an attempted murder case.
The cooperator testified at trial that on the night of the shooting, he
met with the defendant and gang leader in the apartment, that he
saw the gang leader give the defendant a gun, after which he and the
defendant left the apartment and subsequently shot the victim.
They returned to the apartment and the defendant reported the
shooting to the gang leader. Another cooperator corroborated the
first one, testifying that he was on the scene of the shooting and
called the gang leader in his apartment to report the shooting. Both
cooperators presented very precise and detailed testimony about the
night of the shooting. The problem for the prosecution was that on
the night of the shooting, the hospital records reflected that the gang
leader was in the hospital hooked up to an IV."'
The former AUSA reports that he produced the hospital records
showing that the gang leader was in the hospital because he had been
shot two nights earlier.
The hospital records reflected that the nurses checked on him every
hour.... It seemed clear that these people lied. The client was
acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of conspiracy to
commit murder. I ask not only how could the jury believe these
guys who perjured themselves but most significantly, how can the
prosecutor believe them?137 The prosecutor took the outrageous
position that the hospital records proved nothing because the
defendant could have snuck out of the hospital, gone home to give
out the guns, and run back to the hospital in time to get checked on
by the nurses. This is a classic example of prosecutors buying their
own bullshit. It happens to a lot of young prosecutors.138
In another instance, a former AUSA reports that the cooperator's
testimony was so important to a case that the evaluation of his
veracity was skewed through the lens of his utility to the government.
I had a case where a client charged with RICO was cooperating.
The prosecution needed him. I debriefed him extensively but he
minimized and lied in his first seven or eight proffers. He would
swear up and down, I told you everything. The agents were good.
135. 1-16, supra note 57.
136. 1-2, supra note 57.
137. Even though lawyers are not permitted to vouch for the credibility of
witnesses, the very fact that the government has called a cooperator to testify often
reduces a jury's level of scrutiny of that witness.
138. 1-24, supra note 57.
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They knew. They needed him badly enough so they came back
because he was the linchpin to another indictment. He gave me
more information. Was it truthful? How the hell do I know when
someone has lied to you so repeatedly? It is hard for me to imagine
that the prosecution knew where the truth ended because much of
what they were doing was comparing it to what another cooperator
said.139
Many similar stories were reported by a significant number of the
defense lawyers interviewed.'1 It appears that, particularly in high
profile cases, the pressures and mindset of some prosecutors make it
less likely that the government will carefully examine lies by its
cooperators. In six cases that had received considerable publicity, the
defense lawyers exposed not mere inconsistencies, but outright lies, by
cooperators that they deemed significant to the outcome of the case.
In each case, the lies were dismissed by the government as either
mistakes by the witnesses or not significant to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
In one of these highly publicized cases, the chief cooperator, despite
extensive briefing by the prosecutor, failed to reveal millions of
dollars of tax evasion and numerous fraudulent schemes in which he
was involved with four people whom he was protecting from
prosecution. The defense
theory was that he blamed the defendant in lieu of the four other
people. The lies were exposed on cross examination. No action was
taken against the cooperator.
There are instances where these defense lawyers say they would
"bet [their] li[ves] on the fact that what the cooperator said was a
complete lie"'' but that they knew that the prosecutor could not see
the truth. In one drug case, cooperator A implicated cooperator B in
a homicide. Cooperator B adamantly denied involvement in the
homicide. The government said to cooperator B, in sum and
substance:
Look we believe everything else you told us is true, so just tell us
about the homicide even if you just thought about it, dreamed it or
139. Id. These examples reflect the inherent problems in any study questioning
lawyers, whether or not they have been former prosecutors, about the truthfulness of
witnesses for the opposing party. Each adversarial role has its own set of
assumptions, values, and interests. While acknowledgment of this role difference
does not invalidate the observations of former AUSAs and other defense lawyers, it
necessarily reflects possible biases in such a study.
140. Other than the prevalence of other defense lawyer accounts of exposing lies
by cooperators during cross examination, there was little distinction between former
AUSAs and other defense lawyers regarding instances of cooperator embellishment
in the cooperation process.
141. D-17, supra note 57.
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would not mind if it happened. I told the client, even if you
dreamed you were part of it, you get your 5K. He would not do it.
He would have saved himself ten years had he just adopted the
government's version of events.142
6. Cultural Barriers
One case, described as the "most difficult and frustrating case" that
a former AUSA had handled, involved linguistic and cultural barriers
that made it very difficult to assess the cooperator's credibility.
In a white collar money laundering (structuring) case, all of the
defendants were Chinese. We had an extremely difficult time
debriefing the cooperators because, even with interpreters, you have
no clue what they are saying. With a Spanish speaking defendant
you can judge the body language and tone of voice that are
important in assessing credibility. In Chinese, the intonation,
inflection, body language, and culture are so different that you
cannot evaluate whether they are truthful. We investigated that
case for more than a year but even so we had no idea what these
witnesses would say at trial and whether they were telling the truth.
We were in bed with these guys and we thought they were telling the
truth. We knew there was a crime there and we knew the
defendants were in on it. The cooperators were telling me they were
in on it. I went into trial not confident that I knew what any witness
would say and I thought they would sabotage the case. That's
exactly what happened. They gave such wishy-washy testimony and
made out a prima facie case, but they did better for the defense.1 4
3
Another former AUSA reported:
In a string of cases with Chinese defendants, we had experience with
untruths because it was extremely difficult to get answers to
questions. It may have been cultural. It could have been the
interpreter but we conducted 10-12 proffer sessions because it was
like pulling teeth to get the information. If you did not ask the exact
question, you would get no answer. It was laborious and the
nuances are lost when you go though an interpreter:
Q: How did you know each other?
A: We used to see each other.
Q: Where?
A: We used to go out.
Q: Where did you meet?
A: At the bowling alley.1"
142. Id.
143. 1-15, supra note 57.
144. 1-8, supra note 57.
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7. Attitudes of Individual Assistants
At least six former AUSAs believed that the attitude of individual
assistants determined how much assurance they could have in the
truthfulness of cooperators. These former AUSAs described many of
their colleagues as having "law enforcement"'14 s or "gung ho" or a
"true believer" mentality.
There's a breakdown in the office of "true believers" and others.
The true believers are more macho and fit in with the agents. Some
become friends with agents. I believed that these people targeted
bad guys and then would push the margins to achieve a result. True
believers are those who most identify with law enforcement and
could never imagine that they would be defense attorneys. They
tend not to see gray in situations. It is all black and white.1
There's not a healthy difference between their role and that of the
agents. 147
These former AUSAs did not have any proof that those lawyers did
"push the margins" because:
you would not know what other people were doing until you sat in
court and watched them. It was just a sense.148
One of those known as a true believer described the view he and his
close colleagues shared:
Our energy came from getting the bad guys off the street. We
wanted to make a difference. We believed in the cause of justice. It
was exciting, cops and robbers, better than TV.... People look
down on us for our enthusiasm but we left no stone unturned. 49
145. Several interviewees who worked in the Southern District prior to 1980
compared the mind set of prosecutors today with prosecutors during their term in the
office. The distinction noted was that assistants prior to 1980 operated as barristers,
that is, their role was not primarily the investigation of cases, but review of the work
of various federal agencies and prosecution of cases. Today's prosecutors were
described as having "law enforcement mentality. They are cops. Seventy-five percent
of their work is investigation of crime and hence their objectivity as lawyers is
skewed." D-2, supra note 57; see D-3, supra note 57; D-4, supra note 57; D-5, supra
note 57; D-7, supra note 57; I-1, supra note 57; 1-2, supra note 57; 1-7, supra note 57; 1-
10, supra note 57; 1-12, supra note 57; 1-15, supra note 57; 1-19, supra note 57. While
former AUSAs historically have been critical of the office once they begin to
represent defendants and notoriously bemoan the latest prosecutorial action with the
claim that "we did not do things like this in my day," this view is shared widely among
many lawyers who have worked in the system over many years. The Sentencing
Guidelines are noted to have significantly exacerbated the problem. To some extent,
this reported attitudinal difference may reflect changes from the due process model to
the crime control model of criminal justice. See Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 161;
Gershman, supra note 39, at 416.
146. 1-3, supra note 57.
147. 1-19, supra note 57.
148. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-5, supra note 57.
149. 1-21, supra note 57.
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A small group of "true believers" (five lawyers) left a number of
former AUSAs uneasy: they were described as "fast and loose. '150
They were not thorough, they were not law men. They fraternized
with agents, made inappropriate comments. They were not
skeptical in a rigorous way. I would not be surprised if they put on
perjured testimony.151  They were not obsessed with ethical
conduct.152
A related concern is the extent to which the "us and them"
mentality of the office shapes the way in which prosecutors evaluate
cooperators' testimony. The mentality is created by at least two
things. First, new assistants are usually without litigation experience
in criminal justice so they bond with each other particularly when they
have to do battle with experienced defense lawyers.153 Second, the
assistant feels beleaguered.
Everyone talks about the power of the prosecutor but I'm worried
about who's going to yell at me for something that is not my fault. It
is also true that every prosecutor secretly wants to be a cop. The
allure is to get the bad guys. You talk about your agent, the guy
who shows you the ropes. He exudes confidence on the street. 154
8. Lack of Experience
Many former AUSAs discussed the relative youth and lack of life
experience of AUSAs as a significant reason for the failure to
properly assess cooperator credibility and uncover truthful facts.
While former AUSAs acknowledged that their colleagues were well-
intentioned and the "best talent," that talent does not translate into
the necessary skills to debrief cooperators. 55
While the glory of the job is that your goal is to always do the right
150. 1-3, supra note 57.
151. Id.; see 1-5, supra note 57; 1-9, supra note 57; 1-13, supra note 57.
152. 1-5, supra note 57. This criticism may be solely the result of personality and
behavioral differences among lawyers. I interviewed two of those identified as "true
believers" and solicited comments from other lawyers about the extent to which the
perceptions of putting on perjured testimony were universal. There was no
suggestion in the interviews with the "true believers" of anything other than the
highest degree of dedication and rigor in their work. On the basis of these interviews,
it is not possible to conclude that these lawyers were any more likely to engage in less
than rigorous review of facts provided by cooperators.
153. Distinctions were noted in prosecutorial attitudes toward defense lawyers.
Federal defenders and former assistants were trusted readily. "Drug" lawyers were
not noted for their trustworthiness.
154. 1-10, supra note 57; see 1-13, supra note 57.
155. 1-15, supra note 57. Typically, an assistant in the Southern District attended a
top-tier law school, clerked for a judge, then worked at a large law firm for three
years. The prevailing ethos is that lawyers from this background are well-trained,
have high ethical standards, and possess good work habits including careful attention
to detail. The office operates at a high level of practice and there is a great deal of
camaraderie among the assistants.
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thing and the office hires great people, the problem is that the best
talent does not often translate into people who are sufficiently
perceptive about human nature.... [Y]ou need people who are
street smart.
156
You need to learn the difference between bad guys and decent
guys who make mistakes. You need insight into people to be good
at it and the problem with the office is that there is little life
experience. Every young prosecutor is a hard ass and every one of
their cases is the case of the century.'57
Many believed that the relatively homogeneous background of
those hired in the Southern District does not provide for the best
environment for learning to effectively work with cooperators.
By reputation, the stereotype of lawyers in the Southern District is by
and large from privileged backgrounds, ambitious, erudite, and elitist.
They believe that two years at a law firm makes them wise to the world.
In fact, they live a rarified existence. They come from a different walk
of life and are often out of touch with what real crime is.Iss
Prosecutors with some state court experience or sufficient life
experience are perceived as better able to ask the question of "where's
the beef here" and better able to evaluate cooperators.'5 9 "You need
to be able to answer the questions who was lied to, who was hurt or
whose money was taken before you make a decision to prosecute a
crime. - 160
While Southern District prosecutors might be terrific at writing a
thirty page brief on the scope of the wire fraud statute, they often
miss the fact that the crimes they seek to prosecute under that
analysis are marginal crimes at best. The office has become more
credentialist of late. Some of these people may develop very good
judgment and may have skills to work with cooperators, but there
should be a wider range of people hired.1
156. 1-20, supra note 57; see 1-15, supra note 57; 1-21, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note
57. Psychological literature points to additional concerns. Those who work as
AUSAs are readily described as "highly power-motivated people." They are drawn
to positions that give them the "opportunity to direct in an immediate way the
behavior of individual other persons in accordance with some preconceived plan and
use positive and negative sanctions on that behavior." David G. Winter, The Power
Motive (1973). Studies of highly power-motivated people that try to determine how
the power motive affects an individual's ability to listen and work well with others
suggest that they encourage and reinforce in others any expression of opinion that
confirms their own. Those not in that group are better able to listen to others. See
Eugene M. Fodor & Terry Smith, The Power Motive as an Influence on Group
Decision Making, 42 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 178, 178-84 (1982).
157. 1-15, supra note 57.
158. 1-19, supra note 57; see 1-15, supra note 57; 1-23, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note
57.
159. The Southern District hires few lawyers who practiced solely in the state
system, although this has been dependent on the individual United States Attorney.
160. 1-19, supra note 57.
161. 1-13, supra note 57; see 1-23, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note 57.
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The comments reflected criticism of the current culture in
prosecution.
These are people who were raised in the guidelines era only
("Guidelines babies"). 62 Prosecutors who grow up knowing only
the sentencing guidelines have a mechanistic approach to justice.
They don't ask what's the right thing to do. They just want the right
result. 1
63
Virtually all of the other defense lawyers echo this view.1 64
There is a sense that the more reflective people lose out. When
you are discussing a case in a group, the harsher punishment always
seems to be the right answer. It's part of a macho culture of
narcotics where the way to succeed is to be rough.1 65
They are so used to winning and getting to see savage, appalling
sentences, that they get arrogant and hardened to a lot of jail time.
The worst experience is where people have come from the forfeiture
unit to other units. We preach restraint, but those people are so
used to winning, that you have to have your head handed to you to
be tamed.166
Other former assistants expressed concern that the increase in size
of the office had brought quality control concerns. While prosecutors
need excellent skills that might coincide with good credentials, there
should be additional criteria particularly when the office is so large.167
9. Proffer Sessions
The reports of former AUSAs about the conduct of the proffer
sessions reflect and amplify many of the issues noted in the previous
sections about the bases for false beliefs in cooperator truthfulness.
The particular problems associated with these sessions are a relatively
unexplored reason for the prosecution's false beliefs in cooperator
truthfulness. 16
Former AUSAs readily acknowledge the danger that stems from
the overwhelming incentives to lie, including the fact that
"cooperators are eager to please you,"'16 9 and will try to give
information that they believe prosecutors want. Many former AUSAs
discussed the problems inherent in the process, reflecting concerns
162. 1-11, supra note 57.
163. 1-6, supra note 57; see 1-8, supra note 57; 1-12, supra note 57; 1-15, supra note
57.
164. See Gershman, supra note 39, at 416.
165. 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-5, supra note 57; 1-8, supra note 57.
166. 1-7, supra note 57.
167. 1-23, supra note 57.
168. See Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1392 (1996) (discussing how to conduct proffer
sessions).
169. 1-9, supra note 57.
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about the nature and structure of the proffer process and
psychological factors attendant to the relationship with cooperators.
Four AUSAs expressed the belief that, due to a host of factors, most
prosecutors are "horrible" at the cooperation process and many,
unwittingly, obtain false information.170
An overriding concern is the nature of truth and fact. As a former
chief said in response to the question of whether he believed that
cooperators embellish the truth:
I really do not know how to answer that. All I know is that truth is
elusive. Everyone tells you things and people don't even know if
they are embellishing. The greater the incentive structure, the
greater the risk of incriminating others. How much do you really
remember? Mistakes and concurrences vary and now, if you tell
them to a partisan lawyer and it fits the theory, it becomes frozen in
the story because it is useful. The client is alert. His ears pick up
when he reveals certain facts that pique the prosecutor or agent.171
This view was echoed by a number of AUSAs:
There's a lot of complexity and richness about facts and merely
because a person's version is different does not mean that they are
lying.'
This perception, however, does not often translate into
prosecutorial practice. There are a myriad of complicated,
interrelated reasons for this lack of translation. First, there is a
perception that many assistants do not share the complex view of the
nature of truth. While former AUSAs all acknowledged that they
were conscious of the dangers that they and their agents would elicit
embellished testimony, many believe that because they repeatedly
emphasized "we only want the truth" and pointed out to cooperators
the dangers of not being truthful (i.e. ripping up their cooperation
agreement), that they were more likely to receive truthful information
from cooperators.
There's often a linear attitude about the truth. You think you
know what the facts are, so you attempt to get the truth from the
cooperator. Your goal is to get the truth and protect it.173
Most prosecutors simply do not understand how memory works
and the reality of truth. 4
170. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-19, supra note 57; 1-23, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note
57. It is, of course, not possible to ascertain whether these former AUSAs held these
beliefs from their early tenure in the U.S. Attorney's Office or the extent to which
these views are primarily the result of a shift in role.
171. 1-7, supra note 57.
172. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-3, supra note 57; 1-16, supra note 57; 1-18, supra note
57; 1-19, supra note 57; 1-23, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note 57.
173. 1-9, supra note 57.
174. 1-15, supra note 57; see 1-19, supra note 57; 1-24, supra note 57. Information on
how memory works has been derived from work communications theory, decision
making, and computer science. Human memory involves many processes and the
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I learned that it is not that often that the cooperator mirrors what
you thought going into it. You have to be flexible. You have to take
the cooperator's lead and then see if you can corroborate it.17
Moreover, the cooperator's notion of truth is often different from
the AUSAs:
Their version of reality is inaccurate. You have to try to
understand their predicament and what they think you mean by
wanting them to cooperate. Telling them that you just want the
truth is meaningless.176 What is the truth? Truth is very different
when you have lived your life as part of an organization that
commits crimes and lived life through deceit. Truth equals what I
know or what I can be caught at. Truth depends on how you
characterize events in your life.1"
Truth also depends on using the right language. Once I asked how
many times a week, on average, were you in a particular drug spot?
He asked: How long is a week? When I explained I meant 7 days,
he explained that some weeks are 3 days, some are nine days. The
concept of week, of average, is very different. These cooperators are
recall of information is more complicated than retrieving mere copies of experiences
located in a memory bank. Researchers suggest that people actually construct
memories at the time of withdrawal from the experience or at the recollection of it.
See Allison G. Harvey et al., Autobiographical Memory In Acute Stress Disorder, 66 J.
Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 500, 500-06 (1998); Edward R. Hirt, Do I See Only
What I Expect? Evidence for Expectancy-Guided Retrieval Model, 58 J. Personality &
Social Psychol. 937, 937-51 (1990); Marjorie Roth Leon & William Revelle, Effects of
Anxiety on Analogical Reasoning: A Test of Three Theoretical Models, 49 J.
Personality & Social Psychol. 1302, 1302-15 (1985). Phenomena that influence recall
include the order of the event in a sequence (serial position effect), see Dewey
Rundus, Analysis of Rehearsal Processes in Free Recall, 89 J. Experimental Psychol.
63, 63-77 (1971); the conditions under which the memory is recalled, see Harvey et al.,
supra, at 500-06; the stress or anxiety of the person recalling the memory, see Matthew
Dobson & Roslyn Markham, Individual Differences in Anxiety Level and Eyewitness
Memory, 119 J. Gen. Psychol. 343, 343-50 (1992). Moreover, "evaluative
apprehension" (altered memories based on responses to the perceived demands of
the questioner) alters recall of events. Thus, in the field of eyewitness identification,
research demonstrates that memory is reconstructive and dependent on the subject's
current mental state and the wording of the questions posed. See Elizabeth F. Loftus
et al., Semantic Integration of Verbal Information into a Visual Memory, 4 J.
Experimental Psychol.: Hum. Learning & Memory 19, 19-31 (1978). Presuppositions
contained within questions are capable of transforming a witness' memory. See
Howard I. Weinberg et al., Demand and the Impact of Leading Questions on
Eyewitness Testimony, 11 Memory & Cognition 101,101-04 (1983).
175. 1-18, supra note 57.
176. Studies in experimental psychology demonstrate that this over-reliance on
verbal communication ignores what often are the most significant determining factors
of memory recall. See Weinberg et al., supra note 174, at 101-04. Cognitive
researchers have found that when people read or listen to speech, they process
information "between the lines" and recall what was implied. See Richard J. Harris &
Gregory E. Monaco, Psychology of Pragmatic Implication: Information Processing
Between the Lines, 107 J. Experimental Psychol.: Gen. 1, 1-22 (1978); Denis J. Hilton,
The Social Context of Reasoning Conversational Inference and Rational Judgment, 118
Psychol. Bull. 248,248-71 (1995).
177. 1-15, supra note 57.
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very literal in their approach to the world. 78
Second is a lack of understanding of the mindset of the cooperator.
Many of them come in believing This Is What They Want To Hear
Time rather than This Is What Happened Time. Thus, the last thing
you want to do is to feed them information because they will believe
you want them to parrot back that information. The stakes are ve 7
high for them and they will do what they have to to get their letter.
Among the difficulties with many cooperators is that you are
talking across cultures. It is a bit easier with white collar defendants
because you can understand their reality since it is closer to your
own than gang members. But in drug and violence cases, it is very
hard because you have to learn to communicate with someone from
an alien environment. They have typically been in the criminal
justice system since ages 19-21, they have a perspective on cops, and
this is just another arrest, they will soon be out and passed from one
prosecution to another. The fact that this is not the state system is
irrelevant to them. They assume you are posturing when you talk
about the difference in the federal system."
Third, it is easy to make mistakes. Cooperators will
make stuff up that does not make sense such as telling you, out of
the blue, "then he told me he would bring me 2 kilos." In the
context of the case, it does not make sense so you can question
those. You have to be very careful. Mistakes are made when you
have an assistant who really wants to sign the guy up and you have a
young agent. There's an unholy conspiracy to sign him up.1s1
The mistakes are often caused by the relationship that is developed
with the cooperator. While all former AUSAs report that cooperators
do not tell the truth in the first few sessions, a relationship develops
that can shade the view of facts.18 Once a prosecutor has developed a
17& Id.
179. 1-13, supra note 57.
180. 1-15, supra note 57.
181. 1-8, supra note 57. The area of greatest embellishment is conversations that
never took place. Another area of embellishment is:
[A cooperator] inventing a prior relationship with the defendant about
things they had done together, how he knows the person or why the
defendant called him in the first place.
1-8, supra note 57.
The cooperator is not lying about many of the facts, but the manner in which he
characterizes his involvement is not totally truthful. For example, in a drug
conspiracy, a cooperator might say that he is a small guy when his involvement is
more extensive. He might slightly change the role of the other defendants. He might
add some vague drug deals. 1-24, supra note 57.
182. I-1, supra note 57; see 1-2, supra note 57; 1-3, supra note 57; 1-5, supra note 57;
1-8, supra note 57; 1-16, supra note 57. One former AUSA said that the percentage of
cooperators who tell the truth in the first session is "pretty high" but that it depends
on how well they are questioned. "When the cooperator came in, we already knew
about the guy from the arrest, the indictment and we have tapes." She thought this
was particularly true in white collar cases. 1-9, supra note 57. Virtually all of the other
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trusting relationship with the cooperator and entered into a
cooperation agreement, the dynamic can change radically. No longer
is the cooperator's information as carefully scrutinized. 183 Of great
significance is the fact that now the cooperator believes that he is
bound by the information that he gave to prosecutors as part of his
agreement. While prosecutorial efforts to bind a cooperator to a
particular version of events would be unseemly and probably illegal,",
the cooperator expects that he is bound by his earlier version of
events.
Fourth, many prosecutors lack depth of understanding of all of the
factors that influence the evaluation of credibility and believe that
evaluating credibility is "just common sense." Studies in the field of
social psychology demonstrate that claims of ability to tell the
difference between truth and deception are problematic.18
People are poor intuitive judges of truth and deception. In fact,
even so-called experts who make such judgments for a living-police
investigators, judges, psychiatrists, and polygraphers for the CIA
and the FBI, and the military-are highly prone to error.186
Fifth is the difference between the lawyers' and lay people's
thought processes.
Lawyers' minds work through the organization of abstract thought.
The differences in how witness's minds work is often huge. For
instance, I was once prepping a witness in a white collar stolen bond
case. She was not very smart. I was trying to go over the nine page
cooperation agreement with her. It turns out that she did not even
know that she had pleaded guilty. How much did she understand? I
was worried about how good her grip was on everything else. I was
not sure but her story got more textured as time went on. There
were no major inconsistencies with the information we had, so we
had no way to know that it was not true. We tried to corroborate as
much as we could.1"
That former AUSA gives an example of the danger of imposing a
lawyer's view of fact development upon a cooperator who does not
share a lawyer's "obsession with exact facts:"
You might go into a session knowing, or believing, that Javier had a
gun. When you question the cooperator, he tells you that Javier is
part of one of the biggest rings in Upper Manhattan. You ask him
whether Javier used a gun in the incident in question. He will say
interviewees reported that cooperators lied in at least their first session with the
government.
183. 1-10, supra note 57.
184. See Richman, supra note 3, at 101.
185. See Bella DePaulo et al., Diagnosing Deceptive and Mixed Messages From
Verbal And Nonverbal Cues, 18 J. Experimental Psychol. 433, 433-46 (1982).
186. 1-10, supra note 57.
187. 1-9, supra note 57.
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yes. If you don't probe more deeply as to how he knows, you fail to
find out that it's hearsay that has. been imbedded in his mind as fact.
Or he may have come to believe that he actually did see it because
he heard about it from several people. Most people use language in
a very loose way. They lack precision. People don't understand that
they must have first-hand knowledge unless you tell them. He might
go to trial and say that he saw Javier with a gun. That's the danger
of embellishmentlss
Sixth is the style of questioning. There is little, if any, training
about effective interviewing techniques and the dangers inherent in
certain processes.1 9 The interviews demonstrate sharp disagreement
about the most appropriate and best methods of questioning to obtain
the truth from cooperators. It appears to be a relatively prevalent
practice to be confrontational with cooperators: to cross examine
them with facts and accuse them of lying. Many claim this is the
"most effective way" to get to the truth. "You have to break the guy
down.
19 o
To a great extent, the differences appear to be personality driven.
While more than 50% of those interviewed reported that they
engaged in a confrontational, aggressive examination, others said:
You just have to be yourself. I am not a yeller or screamer. Senior
18& Id
189. While the Southern District supervisory personnel spend significant time
concerned about cooperator testimony, the concerns do not translate into sufficient
training. The training regarding cooperators typically consists of one or two lectures
about cooperators with the oft-repeated caveat that all cooperators lie to minimize
their conduct. The possibility of the embellishment of facts to implicate others in
order to obtain a benefit is not discussed except by reference. Otherwise, training for
the conduct of proffer sessions occurs on the job. Some prosecutors sit through
proffer sessions conducted by other assistants when they begin in General Crimes.
Many, however, reported that they were left to their own devices in proffer sessions
to determine the course of the session, the types of questions asked, and the nature of
information sought. The results of debriefings were, however, reviewed with the
deputy chief of their unit. Particularly in the era when prosecutors were required to
memorialize reasons for cooperation with specific factual details, supervisors would
often ask questions that required the prosecutor to elicit further information to
corroborate the cooperator version of events or to follow up in greater detail to
determine the truthfulness of their information.
Several prosecutors noted:
I had no idea what I was doing. Here I was from the halls of an Ivy League
school, a clerkship, and a law firm, and now I was spending all of my time
with drug dealers and guys with guns. I had no idea how to deal with them
or to determine how truthful they were.
1-3, supra note 57.
You learn as you go along. It depends on the kind of person you are. I tend
to believe people until proven otherwise.
1-3, supra note 57; see 1-7, supra note 57.
You have to get burned once to learn.
1-7, supra note 57.
190. 1-21, supra note 57.
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prosecutors will tell you to do what works for you.'91
When you are new, sometimes your second chair told you to yell
and scream.192
Many who did not begin as "screamers" got tougher with
cooperators during their tenure at the office.
You only learn about getting information from cooperators after
you have watched a defense lawyer rip apart your cooperator. Then
you get tougher with them.1
93
Others are disturbed by the confrontational approach but used it on
occasion.
Sometimes you have to get confrontational with the cooperators and
point out to them the inconsistencies of facts. They may then say,
Well, maybe it happened that way, and I say back to them, I don't
want maybes. I want only what happened. I want only the truth. I
must tell you that if you do not tell the truth you only hurt yourself,
because if I find out that you're lying, you'll lose your "5K" letter.194
We can exert enormous psychological pressure on them. 195
Other assistants are extremely uncomfortable with confronting
cooperators with statements such as "you're lying" or walking out of
the room. "I don't think that's the way you should treat people. It's
not professional and you are not a cop."'196
Such approaches may not only be unprofessional but highlight the
concerns of one former AUSA regarding the possibilities of eliciting
false testimony:
I have found the cooperation process more frightening since I have
become a defense lawyer and have become much more cynical.
First the clients minimize, then boom, they're pressed and
understand that the information they are providing is not enough to
earn them their benefit and the floodgates open. Is it truthful? I
don't know. It's frightening.197
Seventh is the communication about the cooperator's progress
191. 1-9, supra note 57.
192. Id.; see 1-17, supra note 57.
193. 1-9, supra note 57. As one interviewee stated "narcotics is like cops and
robbers. It's exciting, like a game. The hours are crazy, it's not subtle nor about legal
issues." 1-3, supra note 57; see 1-10, supra note 57; 1-13, supra note 57. "The way to
succeed is to be tough, to be rough, as in proffer sessions." 1-3, supra note 57.
194. 1-13, supra note 57.
195. 1-16, supra note 57. Former AUSAs, of course, acknowledge the following
situation:
You, of course, have to be very careful because they might pick up the
message that you want the facts to be a certain way. A lot of it depends on
the good judgment of the assistant and the agent.
1-4, supra note 57; see I-1, supra note 57; 1-2, supra note 57; 1-3, supra note 57; 1-9,
supra note 57.
196. 1-19, supra note 57; see 1-23, supra note 57.
197. 1-23, supra note 57.
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during the debriefing sessions. Prosecutors appear to be unaware of
the extent to which they express, verbally and/or non-verbally, that
they are disappointed that the cooperator does not know particular
facts or that they express a genuine interest in information about a
particular person. Former assistants report that:
They signal to the cooperator that he is not helping himself and that
he needs to give them more information. He may have more
information. I don't know for sure but I do know that I have
debriefed him to the ends of the earth and somehow now for the
first time, he finds information that helps the government.',
Another defense lawyer (who had been a Southern District
assistant many years ago) believes that embellished testimony is the
"dirty little secret" of our system. He points to a typical scenario of
debriefing in a conspiracy case that is bound to encourage
embellishment and is symptomatic of cooperation.
During the proffer session, it is clear that the agent believes that
five people, including Jones, were present at a meeting to discuss
distribution of drugs. The agent asks the cooperator.
Who was present at the meeting. The cooperator mentions some
names but does not include Jones.
Was anyone else there? The cooperator says no.
Are you telling me that Jones was not there?
At that juncture, the cooperator knows what the agent wants to
hear. Moreover, the agent might then say, look I know that Jones
was there. Let's take a break. The agent then walks off with your
client. After the break, when the client is asked again, he knows that
Jones was there.
The lawyer said, "look I do not know if Jones was there or not. I
never heard him say that in all of my time with him. It could be true.
It helps my client if he knows that, so I certainly am not going to
complain about it. Nor is the information that I have sufficient to
trigger an ethical duty to correct the information or to resign." 199
It is generally confined to drug, organized crime cases, and some
mail fraud cases, primarily those that go to trial. It is not that
innocent people are being implicated. Defendants usually are
involved in one way or another, but I have no way to know whether
the client is putting people at meetings because he believes, rightly
or wrongly, that they were really there or he knows that's what they
want to hear.3
Few former AUSAs reported similar instances wherein the
cooperator proffered facts during proffer sessions that they believed
to be embellished.' °  In part, this lack of information about
198. D-4, supra note 57; see D-2, supra note 57.
199. D-4, supra note 57.
200. Id.
201. The vast majority of other defense lawyers did not report instances where they
believed that embellishment had occurred during proffer sessions. Many of them did,
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embellishment might be the result of the fact that, in many cases, the
attorney is not present to reflect sufficiently on the course of the
debriefing sessions.2' A former chief of a unit noted:
In drug cases, most lawyers leave the cooperators alone with us
after the introductory session when we hear the cooperator's
overview of the case. I never remember a case where the defense
lawyer came to all cooperation sessions. ,21 I always liked it when
the defense lawyer would leave because I get to bond with the
cooperator and bonding is an essential element of the cooperation
experience. The cooperator must trust and fear you at the same
time and it's much more difficult with the lawyer there.
It's like the Stockholm Syndrome-You want them to be isolated
so that they learn to trust you and know that you have the
information about them so they will give up the information they
have.2°4
Eighth is the content of information communicated to the
cooperator. Many former AUSAs found it disturbing that so many
assistants give facts to cooperators in the course of eliciting
information from them.
The notion of giving the cooperator facts is very dangerous and
should not be done. You should be gathering the facts, not
influencing the facts.... That rule is honored in the breach.2 5
There are many assistants whose inclination is to show evidence to
a witness. I second sat many trials and saw it repeatedly.20 6
Assistants often have a theory of the case and a specific factual
scenario they believe to be true when they confront a cooperator.
To the extent that the cooperator's story varied from the
however, respond to the question of whether they had reason to believe that their
clients were embellishing the truth about others with "How would I know?"
Generally, the government has more information than the defense, hence it is hard
to know whether the client is confirming truthful information or filling out a story.
The government has a frame of reference to ask questions that defense lawyers often
do not. 1-10, supra note 57.
I usually learn something new during a cooperation session. I do not have
personal knowledge of the facts so it would have to come from my sense of
things.
D-6, supra note 57.
202. This is less common in white collar cases where the cooperator can afford
counsel and the lawyer remains with the client, earning fees and protecting the client
against misunderstandings where the prosecutor might come to believe that the
witness is lying or not completely truthful.
203. 1-13, supra note 57. These are primarily CJA lawyers in narcotics cases.
Several former AUSAs noted that some defense lawyers told them that they did not
want to hear the details of the client's story because it might conflict them out of
other cases. Others note that "good" defense lawyers might attend a few sessions and
then let the prosecutor and agents work with the cooperator in further debriefing and
trial preparation.
204. 1-13, supra note 57.
205. 1-19, supra note 57.
206. 1-13, supra note 57.
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prosecution's recitation of facts, the prosecutor will more often than
not believe the cooperator to be lying. Consequently, to get to the
truth, the AUSA will give the cooperator facts to get him to come
clean. For instance, a cooperator might be explaining a drug deal
differently from the information available to the agent and assistant.
The assistant says "the agent said this and this happened. Are you
sure that it happened the way you said it did?" The cooperator then
pipes up with what seems almost like an excited utterance and tells
you it happened the way the agent said. You can convince yourself
very easily in that scenario that the cooperator is now being truthful
because this was your mind set.2 7
Ninth is the inherent difficulty of many types of cases such as the
historical gang cases and those where language barriers make
credibility evaluations questionable.
Crimes of violence people are the hardest to debrief. They often
embellish the other guy's role and claim they are just the lookout.
The danger of embellishment is the greatest here because there are
few wires, and they are old homicide and narcotics deals. In old
homicide cases, there are warring groups, no matches on the gun
and you are pulling people out of state prison as your witnesses.
The debriefing is different in kind not degree. These are cases that
the DA's office could not make; that's why we have them. I have a
concern that we put people [AUSAs] there who did not go through
narcotics. They had one trial and now were debriefing six of these
people.m
Tenth, there is no ability to independently verify the course of
events in debriefing sessions. Prosecutors rarely take notes in their
initial sessions with cooperators,2 9 and the extent to which they
subsequently take notes is variable. While there is
no office policy of not taking notes,210 the office lore is don't take
too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they are
meaningful to you and no one else. You do not want a complete set
of materials that you have to disclose 1
The inconsistencies by cooperators in the debriefing sessions often
are not disclosed. This stems from the mind set that all cooperators
207. 1-16, supra note 57.
208. 1-15, supra note 57.
209. Exceptions are noted in the white collar context where the prosecutor knows
the defense lawyer (a former assistant) and it is expected that the cooperator has
spent countless hours being debriefed by his lawyer. In some instances, the defense
lawyer conducts the proffer session to produce the necessary information.
210. 1-6, supra note 57.
211. 1-9, supra note 57. Some of the more senior former AUSAs believe that the
advantage to the defense of such notes is highly overstated.
The Jencks Act is bad for the skills of defense lawyers because for them to
ritualistically go through minor inconsistencies between the statements at
various proffers and the testimony does not get them very far.
1-7, supra note 57; see I-11, supra note 57.
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lie in their initial sessions with the government. "You know the truth
and your job in those sessions is to get the cooperator there."212
You generally don't take notes until you have enough of the truth.213
Usually the discrepancies are not about the central issue but details
so it's not a setting where you think about Brady. The fact that you
did not turn over the witness's prior statement last week is not
intentional. You just do not remember that they said it last week.214
The prosecutor is paper conscious about its Brady obligations but
not oral conscious.215
Furthermore,
there are cases where the assistant forbade the agent from taking
notes. It's prevalent in big cases.216 The extent of de facto Brady
issues is significant because most oral statements do not get turned
over.217 There's a certain unconscious arrogation of power about it
all."' There really should be a protocol about it.' I think there
should be mandatory notes but the training I would do on it is one of
fairness and practical wisdom: You will be told by others that you
should not take notes, but in many cases you will be better off to




This Article is a preliminary examination of the extent to which the
role of cooperators and the cooperation process under the Sentencing
Guidelines have created or exacerbated problems regarding the
reliability of cooperator testimony. The interviews that form the basis
of this Article expose the reasons that prosecutors may believe
unreliable information provided by cooperators. These reasons are:
lack of corroboration for cooperator information, particularly in small
narcotics and historical gang cases; lack of thorough investigation;
insufficient evidence; unwarranted trust of cooperators; the
development of a rigid theory of a given case; cultural barriers
212. 1-9, supra note 57.
213. 1-15, supra note 57.
214. 1-9, supra note 57.
215. 1-8, supra note 57. Interviewees used the term "Brady" to refer to the
government's discovery obligations pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (exculpatory information), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1971)(information to impeach government witnesses), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1994). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 (stating that witness' pretrial statements adopted or
approved by the witness are discoverable). In many instances, the statements
obtained during the proffer sessions are not Brady material, but are discoverable
pursuant to these other obligations.
216. 1-18, supra note 57.
217. 1-7, supra note 57.
218. 1-24, supra note 57.
219. 1-18, supra note 57.
220. 1-7, supra note 57.
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between defendants and prosecutors; attitudes of individual assistants;
and lack of experience of many assistants. Many of these problems
are reflected in the conduct of proffer sessions where additional
psychological factors and the dynamics of the process may lead
prosecutors to falsely believe the testimony of cooperators.
The results of these interviews suggest that further study is needed
to determine what changes should be implemented to decrease the
risks of false information from cooperators in the post-Guidelines era.
Those involved in the criminal justice system need to reflect on the
many proposals that have been recommended to minimize the risks of
unreliable cooperator testimony. For example, there have been
repeated calls to examine the operation of discretionary power of the
prosecutor 21 Many have called for a fundamental change in the
balance between criminal defense and prosecution and a revision of
the "government's monolithic power in debates over criminal justice
policy. ' '2m
Among the specific and wide-ranging proposals are the abolition of
mandatory minimum sentences, 3 changes in evidentiary rules and
jury instructions regarding corroboration, 4  redistribution of
discretion within the criminal justice system,225 the adoption of an
administrative adjudicative model of prosecution,2 reforms of the
substantial assistance process,227  prosecutorial standards for
substantial assistance,' new ethical rules for prosecutors, a
numerical limit on the number of cooperators that the prosecution
may use230 and an effective independent disciplinary system.
There must be a belief that if you step over the line, there will be
some enforcement. There needs to be a system of Internal
Affairs.231
Another suggestion, recognized to be "novel to American
tradition" is the creation of a standing commission that includes lay
221. See David Burnham, Above the Law. Secret Deals, Political Fixes and Other
Misadventures of the U.S. Department of Justice 344-45 (1996); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 167 (1969).
222. Richman, supra note 3, at 119 (referring to position of National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers).
223. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 199, 201 (1993); Ronald Weich, The Battle Against Mandatory Minimums: A
Report from the Front Lines, 9 Fed. Sent. Rep. 94, 97 (1996).
224. See Saverda, supra note 3, at 787.
225. See Schulhofer, supra note 223, at 201; Weich, supra note 223, at 97.
226. See Lynch, supra note 42, at 2141-45.
227. See Lee, From Gatekeeper, supra note 3, at 251.
22& ld.
229. See Secunda, supra note 45, at 1275-76.
230. See Weinstein, Regulating the Market, supra note 8, at 626.
231. Gershman, supra note 39, at 443; Federal Prosecution Authority in a Changing




people to review the details of cooperation agreements and immunity
agreements that prosecutors would be required to file. 2
More immediate suggestions that flow from these interviews
include a revision of the training programs within prosecutors' offices.
At the very least, prosecutors should be exposed to the experiences of
former assistants who believed the false statements of cooperating
witnesses. Training should include greater attention to the conduct of
proffer sessions. Moreover, mandatory note taking during those
sessions needs serious consideration. 3 Others have suggested that
the Chief of the Criminal Division, as is the case in the Southern
District, should be a person with experience as a defense lawyer.2-
For many years, commentators believed that the risk that innocent
people would be convicted was of serious concern. Until the advent
of DNA technology, which thus far, has resulted in the exoneration of
sixty-one innocent people, fifteen of whom were falsely convicted
based upon testimony of informants, there was no procedure to
effectively demonstrate the realization of that risk.235 Short of the
discovery of a DNA truth telling gene, the criminal justice system
should carefully examine the implications of the comments of former
Assistant United States Attorneys.
232 See Hughes, supra note 3, at 20.
233. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 Crim. L.
Bull. 550, 550-67 (1987).
234. As one interviewee stated:
Career prosecutors are inevitably cynical about the human race. It's the
nature of prosecutors to only see people as their crimes. The defendant is
not really a person. He's a drug dealer. It's not because prosecutors are
narrow in their human vision. It's because the defendant's actions come to
you as a piece of behavior. Someone who has been a defense lawyer gets to
see the person and is aware of the complexities and motivations, the
ambiguities of acts and sees things from a different tactical perspective.
1-7, supra note 57.
235. See, e.g., National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Draft Report,
Recommendations for Handling Applications for Postconviction DNA Testing, at 7(Feb. 1999) ("[A]t least 55 convictions in the United States have been vacated on the
basis of DNA results."). See generally Edward Connors et al., National Institute of
Justice, U.S Dep't of Justice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (1996)
(evaluating 28 case studies of DNA evidence establishing post-trial innocence);
Richard C. Deiter, Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of
Executing the Innocent, Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Report (July 1997) (discussing cases
of inmates released from death row).
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